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CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES IN AFRICA WITH A VIEW TO THE REVIVAL OF LONG-TERM PLANNING FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURES OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES

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INTRODUCTION

1. Since 1960, the vast majority of African countries have accumulated a rich and diversified experience in planning. Today, almost all the countries (45 out of 51) have planning structures and mechanisms. Even if the term 'planning' does not have the same meaning in all the countries and even if the implementation approaches, mechanisms and modalities differ from country to country, overall, the potential for local planning has increased substantially in the face of the numerous socio-economic development constraints. Potential skills, particularly skilled manpower and technical expertise in planning make it possible to analyse increasingly complex and critical socio-economic situations and thereby to draw up fairly sound, justified and workable national, subregional and regional plans.

2. Ironically, for more than a decade now, credible development planning on the continent has been at its lowest ebb. The attention of Governments is focused essentially on the demands of short-term management of prevailing crises. For several years now, many countries have abandoned all pretence of planning and have been bogged down in endlessly repetitive structural adjustment programmes that are manifestly inappropriate for the structural transformation of African economies and of their self-sustained development.

3. It is obvious that such an attitude contrasts sharply with the progressive efforts and peak development planning achieved in the wake of independence, when most Governments prepared such plans and when planning aroused great hopes on the continent and among development aid agencies and institutions. This has led to serious disarray among planning institutions and in the implementation of economic policies, a marked deterioration if not actual abandonment of the national economic decision-making process, which process is now characterized by widespread incoherence and an actual and gradual transfer of decision and policy-making power to donors.

4. Among the main causes of this most unwelcome situation, occurring at a time when major events of national and international impact are posing a real challenge to planners are the persistent economic and social crises, wrong ideas about the planning process, numerous technical deficiencies, lack of realism and of firm commitment to the implementation of plans adopted. In fact, the widespread substitution of inadequate SAPs for national plans, the challenging of African systems to democratize, the collapse of the planned economies of Eastern Europe, the resounding triumph of free enterprise, the reorientation of the priorities of the OECD countries towards the countries of the East (which will further weaken an already divided Africa succumbing to the weight of multiple problems) and the impending advent of the African Economic Community, urgently demand an evaluation of planning practice and techniques and the definition of an appropriate strategy and instruments for the indispensable integration of short- medium- and long-term socio-economic concerns.

5. This study falls within the above framework and is aimed particularly at stimulating national, subregional and regional development and implementation of an immediate programme of action for reviving development planning in Africa.

I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PLANNING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES

A. 1960s' euphoria in planning despite weak technical and institutional capacities

6. In the wake of independence, African countries set themselves the task of defining the measures that they intended to implement to complement their political independence with economic

independence. Among those measures, pride of place was given to development planning, whose necessity was acknowledged by all shades of opinion in view of the immensity of the task ahead and the numerous implications of the unavoidable reorganization and restructuring of the economies inherited from the colonial system. For the newly-independent African countries, planning was a symbol of progress and autonomy and an effective means of acceding to genuine economic independence. It also made it possible to assess and to bridge the gap between themselves and the developed countries. The justification for this position was:

(a) The success of the Soviet five-year plans that had propelled the country to the position of the second world power in less than 50 years;

(b) The need for foreign assistance which could not be secured without a national economic development plan;

(c) The experience acquired during the colonial period in certain countries where planning had been instituted.

7. Overall, however, the planning capacities, namely, institutional framework, the statistical apparatus, skilled manpower, etc. were virtually non-existent. Because of this, the first plans in Africa were prepared largely by foreign technical assistance, including freelance experts, research firms, bilateral assistance teams and missions of international financial institutions, supported by local teams comprising directors of central planning bodies and the few experts of technical ministries, which did not have adequate facilities for project analysis or regional planning. Even when the technical assistance personnel had acquired planning experience elsewhere, they knew very little about development problems in Africa and the few local personnel were young and inexperienced.

8. There was a striking similarity between the development strategies and objectives adopted, although each plan was prepared within a strictly national framework, without taking account of planning in neighbouring countries. Despite the ideological differences, the main concerns were as follows:

(a) Reorganization of the colonial administrative structures with a view to adapting them to socio-economic development objectives;

(b) Reform of domestic trade and distribution channels;

(c) Development of the modern sectors, particularly cash crop agriculture and mining;

(d) Speedy establishment of national local raw material processing industries and research structures for the development of natural resources;

(e) Intensification of schooling and staff training for Africanization of jobs, increasing health care facilities, establishment of social infrastructure, etc.

9. In general, the set objective in all the plans, was the raising of the standards of living and improvement of the living conditions of the people through increased national production and a fair distribution of the national income.

10. The development strategies, on the whole, were founded on increasing the productivity of the modern sectors, particularly agriculture and mining in order to obtain the necessary financial resources for capital, intermediary and consumer goods. Producer prices given to farmers were to help expand domestic demand, increase agricultural productivity and free part of the agricultural labour force for other productive activities, especially in industry. The main purpose of industrialization was to ensure import substitution and, to a lesser extent, to process exportable raw materials and to produce capital and intermediate goods. Besides, industrialization was to promote employment creation and structural changes conducive to economic modernization, promote vocational training and generate domestic savings. However, in so far as the largest share of the resources was to come from abroad, foreign trade became the cornerstone of the established economic system.

11. Theoretically, the plans were comprehensive because they specified objectives for sectoral GDP growth, public and private investment, government and household consumption and exports and imports. However, the objectives were nothing more than indicator projections based, most often, on extrapolations modified on the basis of common sense. While the plans can be classified as indicative or imperative, it should be said that African countries did not have the tools for either of the two types of planning; in other words, their administrative apparatus was quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate for implementing imperative planning. Indicative planning instruments were also disadvantaged by the lack of diversification in the taxation system and by a rudimentary credit system, lack of or very restricted financial market, a large own-account sector and budgetary expenditure composed largely of operating expenses. The formal framework of the plans was therefore limited to securing coherence between investment objectives and domestic and external resources.

12. The pride of place given in plans of the period to the development or investment budget testified to a certain degree of continuity from the colonial period and to the fact that the budget was the main instrument to which the planning body had access. The development budget was also of particular importance to donors in the sense that the initial plan implementation rate most often determined the actual level of development expenditure.

13. Planners paid little attention to the operating budget and planned recurrent development spending was inadequately examined. Moreover, the planning agencies only showed sporadic interest in economic policy instruments such as pricing and credit policies, money supply, exchange rates, currency regulations, regulation of private external borrowing, aid distribution, taxation and public expenditure other than investment. All these instruments which constitute the controls of the economy and which enable its balance to be preserved were not analysed and systematically integrated in the planning system. They were managed independently by such institutions as the Ministries of Finance and Trade and the Central Bank over which planners had no authority.

14. For this reason, the optimism aroused in the 1960s with respect to macro-economic trends, quickly proved to be unrealistic in the face of foreign sector imbalance brought about by extremely slow export growth, increasing dependence on imports and capital flight. The public finance imbalance reflected the rapid growth of operating expenditure as well as the swelling of current expenditure as a result of investments made without detailed study and without serious planning. Along with this, industrial production stagnated as the easiest import-substitution possibilities were quickly exhausted, bringing in its wake a consumption pattern characterized by a widening income gap aggravated by the introduction of highly capital- intensive technologies. Progress made was mainly in the areas of education, health and training.

B. Development planning during the 1970s

15. In the face of this situation, the 1970s witnessed a substantial expansion of planning activity in an effort to remedy the shortcomings of previous attempts. The theoretical scope of planning was expanded at three levels. Firstly, at national level: the increase in the number and size of enterprises led to a substantial extension of the role of the State. Secondly, at subregional level: it seemed that the balkanization of the continent was a factor of external vulnerability that limited growth possibilities and undermined Africa's position in international negotiations. Similarly, the lack of co-ordination between national policies that characterized the initial plans led to the duplication of non-viable projects. Efforts were thus initiated to establish various subregional organizations and to implement various forms of co-operation and integration from which several benefits were expected including increased intra-African trade, integration of industrial production and services, easier and less costly access to foreign technologies and harmonization of national plans. Thirdly, at regional level: the revised ECA master-plan for establishing a new world economic order highlighted the discrepancy between the development strategies adopted in the 1960s and Africa's economic transformation objectives and went on to formulate new strategies for: (i) making specific efforts to secure increased self-sufficiency; (ii) accelerating the internal and autonomous process of growth and diversification; and (iii) gradually eliminating unemployment and mass poverty.

16. In the countries, the institutional planning framework was gradually reinforced with skilled manpower and resources and new planning agencies and posts were created. Permanent structures including ministries or offices, planning and programming departments, units within technical ministries, regional planning services, central statistical offices equipped, in principle, with all the functions necessary for carrying out the planning exercise, namely definition of economic planning policy, studies on the design and implementation follow-up, programming, development project evaluation, organization and direction of programmes, investment co-ordination, organization of consultation with socio-professional groups, harmonization of opinions and possible choices, etc. dominate all socio-economic activities. These are strengthened by such temporary structures as supreme planning councils (the supreme authority responsible for directing economic policies), the planning management committee (the technical guidance body), sectoral technical committees (responsible for the detailed preparation of the plan) and advisory bodies (which give economic and social advice).

17. The planning process, which was more or less complex depending on the country concerned, is governed by the same logic in all systems: definition of political directives by the political authorities; preparation of a general framework by the central planning body; detailed analysis by sectoral committees, synthesis and approval; and implementation and follow-up.

18. In the plan preparation process, sectoral technical committees whose main task is to study prospects by sector and by branch, to specify the objectives to be attained during the final year of the plan and to determine the various resources necessary for their attainment have a vital role to play. Because of the number of these committees (supposed to embrace all activities covered by the plan) and the varying backgrounds of the personnel taking part in the work (theoretically all technical and administrative officials involved in the implementation of the plan both at the national and local levels), their experience, expertise, surveys and basic studies on which they depend, plans are considered to be a collective effort. The comprehensiveness indispensable to balanced planning, is achieved through the harmony of general operating hypotheses, the homogeneity of the estimation methods used and general co-ordination of all evaluations.

19. Although not always clearly obvious, the methods used combine pragmatism and empiricism, for lack of a reliable statistical apparatus with the conventional projection procedures of extrapolation, use of capital coefficient, input-output and consumption models, project analysis, etc. for determining the growth rate of investments, sectoral production and consumption patterns. In some respects, there was a marked development of planning methods during the past two decades with local officials becoming more conversant with them. However, despite the recruitment of a large number of local economists and considerable civil service staff strength, the practice of calling upon foreign technical assistance personnel or financial institutions to prepare plans continued.

20. At the micro-economic level, project evaluation methods were considerably developed. Attempts were also made to conduct systematic analyses of agricultural markets (and pricing policies) and the effectiveness of foreign trade and exchange rate policies. It cannot be said, however, that these analyses are regularly applied in the formulation of policies, but there is now a wealth of experience and data. At the macro-economic level, the increasing use of models has stimulated the search for fundamental relationships, the assessment of statistical data bases and the conduct of more complex macro-analyses.

21. Nevertheless, the expansion of the institutional framework led to a dispersal of planning tasks among a large number of poorly co-ordinated bodies that did not have access to the top officials and which, instead of bringing about greater coherence in planning operations, further disorganized them.

22. For instance, the choice of an appropriate location of the central body and of the institution of a major decision-making process requiring coherent and firm planning have remained an endemic problem that is still unsolved. The quasi-general rule is to separate the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning, with the latter Ministry having no priority over the other ministries. In the few exceptions to this rule namely, Botswana, Ghana and the Central Africa Republic, there has not been any change in the process of resource allocation. In times of economic crises, short-term budgetary concerns relating to the functioning of the public services gain precedence over any investment expenditure. Thus the domestic investment budget prepared by the Ministry of Planning depends on the goodwill of the Ministry of Finance and very often remains a dead letter. Planning authorities are further weakened by the fact that budget estimates are generally not based on those of the basic indicators in the plan. The other technical ministries with the same status as the Planning Ministry, in government hierarchy, also do not submit to its requirements since they have direct access or indirect access through other channels to external financing sources. The Ministry of Planning tries single handedly to keep an up-to-date list of projects which increasingly become unrecognizable as changes are made in the designation, content and orientation of activities.

23. Moreover, planning and finance departments are unable to monitor the financing of projects because disbursement accounting is not their responsibility. This is because the appeal for funds is often made directly between the project management and donors and payments are also made between donors and external suppliers of goods and services. The technical departments themselves do not always have information on the physical implementation of their projects and cannot lay any claim to verifying the relevance of their objectives, the choice of technologies or the quality of the impact of the projects and programmes on the actual living conditions of the people.

24. The private sector which does not have easy access to planning and budget documents because of the bureaucratic tendency to secrecy does not feel a party to the implementation of the

plan since it had no part in preparing it, and only got to know of it through the often very unrepresentative chambers of commerce and industry.

25. Designed without coherence from competing and ambitious political options, macro-economic projections totally detached from economic, financial and socio-cultural realities, and within the context of ritual state budgeting based on the computation of project ideas within technical ministries, plans are implemented amidst inter-governmental and inter-bureaucratic rivalries, in other words in a disorder that leaves no room for co-ordination and harmonization of the plans at the subregional level. Subregional co-ordination structures which depend on national budgets to function, struggle for survival and attempt to implement, with State backing, projects financed by external sources and which are not included in the planning process.

C. Marginalization of planning systems during the 1980s

26. During the 1980s, several initiatives were made at the regional level to base planning on specific strategies and objectives suited to the economic development and growth of the continent. These were the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL), Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) and the African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF SAP).

27. However, during this period, the trend towards the low rate of planning was reinforced by the serious and widespread economic crises that the continent was going through and whose visible consequences from 1980 to 1989 were the decline in various sectors i.e. 1.7 per cent in per capita income, 1.9 per cent in gross fixed capital formation, 2.7 per cent and 3 per cent in the volume of imports and exports respectively, 3.1 per cent in commodity prices, coupled with a quadrupling of unemployment, a doubling of the debt burden to $US 256 billion in 1989 and an increase from 17 to 18 of the number of least developed African countries.

28. With the continuation of the crisis and the attendant mounting uncertainty, the international environment and growth conditions have become less and less foreseeable over a long period of time, making the urgency of unmet needs and the tensions that they engender even more critical. Macro-economic and financial imbalances result in more intense intervention of external partners in debt payments and in the policies for bringing about a balance. The countries continued to engage in an unending succession of structural adjustment that came to replace long-term development strategies: numerous plans prepared in keeping with the objectives of the LPA and FAL were purely and simply cast aside without any hope of being implemented.

29. The crisis has undermined the belief in planning for several reasons:

(a) The leverage of Governments in decisions on the allocation of resources has been drastically reduced and even totally eliminated;

(b) The policies implemented in structural adjustment programmes have nothing in common with the usual stages associated with economic planning;

(c) The crisis has put in question the effectiveness of previous planning efforts and strengthened the arguments of those who had criticized public intervention in those efforts.

30. The erosion of the leverage of Governments came about as the result of the increasing share of external aid in development budgets, which affected the distribution of external resources as well as predetermining national contributions to projects financed and influencing the trends in recurrent expenditure for the selected projects. In fact, decisions on investments, particularly public investments are made during negotiations on aid and debt repayment.

31. Structural adjustment policies aim, inter alia, at trimming down the public sector, eliminating price distortions in the various sectors, liberalizing trade, promoting savings and over and above that securing balanced budgeting and balance-of-payments equilibrium through the adjustment of exchange rates, devaluation, interest rates policy aimed at encouraging savings and better resources allocation, credit control and reduction of public expenditure. States implementing adjustment programmes seek to restore liquidity in their economy and to withdraw from the productive sectors. Deplorably, SAPs are generally prepared with the support of the World Bank and IMF independently of any consultation with the parties to the social contract under which the plan will be implemented.

32. The wide range of instruments available to Governments for restoring general economic balance include: the budget, the money supply, credit, exchange control regulations, exchange rates, regulations on external borrowing and, to a lesser extent, aid distribution. In African countries, these measures come largely under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. Structural adjustment programmes are going to move the centres of decision-making mainly towards these institutions, leading to a loss of influence of the Planning Ministry and indeed the marginalization of the planning systems in keeping with liberal thinking that local prices should reflect international market prices and also that State control should be minimized. Such a concept seems to suggest that planning should have as little influence as possible on the international economic relations which form the backbone of African economic systems.

33. The modalities of adjustment programme implementation and the major role played by the World Bank and IMF have also deepened and widened donor interference in the work that falls within the area of competence of national planning systems: advice on economic policy options could lead to strict conditionalities regarding the securement of funds for projects planned under investment programmes, close supervision in the execution of certain projects, establishment of totally autonomous economic diagnosis and forecast facilities by certain multilateral or bilateral agencies, some of which could conduct their own economic surveys, process the data and analyse them to back up their standpoints during negotiations with the countries, etc.

34. In practice, the diversity of aid bodies and procedures and the concern of donors to maintain direct contacts with each administration responsible for the programme, make it possible to evade any central control, making the co-ordination of aid which is the responsibility of the Planning Ministry difficult. Moreover, the short term collection, processing and analysis of information on public finances and debt often involve all the planning, forecasting and statistical services. This aspect introduced in statistical and planning work by donors should not be underestimated. The poor quality of data on household consumption, savings, employment and mobility patterns or those relating to regional and spatial development is due to the little importance that donors attach to income distribution issues. The countries themselves have not paid enough attention to the development of the statistical services so that in several countries macro-economic data collection has advanced very little or has even deteriorated. Such deterioration of the statistical base makes planning more difficult since a decline in planning, in turn, contributes to greater incoherence of the statistical system. In fact, good statistics are produced in response to specific needs.

35. Another major consequence of adjustment programmes is that with the erosion of the central control exercised over resource allocation and the ever-increasing external share in investment financing, the objective of planning has shifted from rational resource allocation to the search for external financing, with the plans reduced to a list of projects proposed to external aid agencies for selection. A fairly widespread trend in the implementation of SAPs during the 1980s was the system of triennial rolling programming (Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Gabon, Senegal, Mali, Botswana, Seychelles, the Niger, etc.) which made it possible to clearly outline the annual investment budget and medium-term investment programme. The triennial public investment programme, in principle, comprises macro-economic perspectives for a three-year period and a portfolio of projects included in the consolidated public investment budget (comprising State resources, gifts and funds drawn on external credits subscribed, guaranteed or reallocated by the State. The first year of the programme corresponds to the financial investment budget voted by law. The triennial public investment programme is roll-sequenced to cover the budget year and all State investments. It involves an annual evaluation of financing capacities and the implementation of studies on the timeliness and feasibility of the projects concerned. It also formally introduces the procedure of competent budgeting and is equivalent to a law. While it resembles a long-term planning process (enumeration of macro economic indicators and listing of supporting projects), the triennial public investment programme corresponds to the logic of SAP and not to that of long-term planning. Adjustments are based on actual, particularly external financing possibilities and not really on long-term development objectives and priorities. Its preparation is also far from being the product of collective effort, a worthwhile objective pursued in the preparation of national development plans.

36. The quality of investment programming thus undertaken depends on three elements: availability of the statistics necessary for macro-economic and macro-financial framing, methodologies and project evaluation and selection techniques and the taking-over by the technical ministries of certain investment programming and monitoring tasks. These three conditions are far from being met. In fact, there are long delays in the production of national accounting statistics in many countries, with the capacity to select projects being totally contingent on the availability of external financing. Ministerial departments rarely monitor the physical implementation or impact of projects. Even worse, just as in the case of national plans, popular participation or the organization of a permanent dialogue for such participation is totally lacking.

37. To sum up, development planning experiences in Africa are characterized by poor performance in the fulfilment of objectives and by numerous deviations from official priorities. The reasons for this are the unsuitability of the development models adopted, unrealistic projections, lack of cohesion between objectives and the resources for achieving them, numerous technical deficiencies at the level of design and implementation, strong external dependence and the lack of control over the resultant economic policy instruments. The vulnerability and precarious nature of the main activities of the majority of the people (agriculture, subsistence and informal activities) limit the impact of normative planning. SAPs that have gradually replaced development plans are inappropriate because they are focused on the short-term and the regulatory function of the market, contrary to common knowledge that many problems cannot be left at the mercy of an imperfect market incapable of seizing development opportunities.

38. The elimination of the strategic function of planning by SAPs has several adverse consequences: the long-term consequence of policy decisions are neglected as are essential issues such as income distribution, population, employment, popular participation, appropriate development and long-term structural models. On the other hand, thinking on these issues has clearly shown, in AAF-SAP, that the main problems of Africa are not primarily those of adjustment

and restoration of balances but rather those of the very essence of development, the priority needs to be addressed, the social and cultural balance to be achieved and what all that imposes on relations with the outside world. Africa's true problems, its most urgent ones today, are long-term problems.

II. INTEGRATION OF THE LONG, MEDIUM AND SHORT TERMS THROUGH THE RENEWAL AND REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN AFRICA

A. Brief review of Africa's development objectives as defined in the Lagos Plan of Action and in AAF-SAP

39. The institution of a long-term planning process that integrates the short and medium terms should now be the absolute priority of Africa. This is because there is no doubt that the effect of population and urban growth, the meeting of social needs, and the response to the destruction of the ecosystems require a long-term view of the future of the entire region and that investments and infrastructural planning should contribute to economic integration. There is also no doubt that the current institutional crisis demands reconstruction plans which should go beyond the strictly national framework. Moreover, the profound changes under way in international division of labour, new prime sectors, and shifting centres of gravity compel Africa to find new niches and to seek a new position in international relations, bearing in mind that the external actors who now influence its dealings themselves have long-term perspectives that Africans should familiarize themselves with, analyse and take into account.

40. That Africa's long-term development preoccupations are of major concern emerged clearly from the Addis Ababa Joint Statement by African Ministers of Economic Development and Planning and Ministers of Finance and in resolution 676 (XXIV) on AAF-SAP adopted by African Ministers of Economic Development and Planning in April 1989 after due consideration of the continuing deterioration of economic, financial and social conditions in the region despite the laudable efforts made to apply general reforms and structural adjustment and stabilization programmes and the urgent need to institute sustained structural transformation, growth and development within a coherent and practical conceptual framework that integrates the short and medium terms. Only renewed and dynamic development planning could constitute such a framework for the speedy implementation of Africa's development objectives as stipulated in the LPA and reiterated in AAF-SAP.

41. These objectives which are worth mentioning are:

(a) Firstly, to alleviate mass poverty and to improve the living standards of African people. Secondly, the concept of self-sustained development is considered essential especially as regards such short-term basic objectives as the attainment of food self-sufficiency, the provision of critical goods and services, etc. While acknowledging the inter-dependence of the economies of the world the LPA also emphasizes the need to achieve collective national and regional autonomy;

(b) Within the framework of the current imperatives of revival and transformation, AAF-SAP reiterated and redefined the above-mentioned objectives by emphasizing that the urgency of alleviating mass poverty and of improving the standard of living of African people did not simply derive from humanistic and altruistic considerations but were predicated, above all, on the provision that development has to be engineered by the people themselves through their full and active

participation. AAF-SAP emphasizes that the attainment of food self-sufficiency calls for a change in the food consumption patterns and efforts to maintain population growth at sustainable levels. It is therefore important to ensure a realignment of the consumption patterns with the production capability in Africa given that Africa should constantly have three major considerations in view, namely, access of the poor to basic factors of production, especially land, creation of employment opportunities and improving the patterns of distribution of national wealth. It is acknowledged that the most difficult task for Africa in its efforts to transform its structures is the transformation of production processes. The most important dimensions of this task are increasing the productivity and efficiency of resources, decreasing the dependency of external resources and securing broad-based participation of people in deciding what they need and producing the relevant goods and services. Consequently, the institution of an endogenous development process is the only way that will enable African countries to achieve autonomy and to carry out authentic economic and social transformation;

(c) Furthermore, the integration of African economies and the attainment of collective self-reliance involves three inter-dependent dimensions, namely, the integration of the physical, institutional and social structures, the integration of production structures and the integration of African markets.

B. The urgency of instituting a process of long-term planning for the short, medium and long terms

42. The attainment of self-sustained development which is human-centred and aimed at the integration of the economies of the region requires the adoption of a long-term development planning process that would include both short-term and medium-term plans as well as articulated technical and logical stages in the long-term plan. This plan should itself be based on a firm and legitimate political will, a rational and methodological process and reliable economic policy instruments at the national, subregional and regional levels.

43. The process of long-term planning therefore presupposes the existence:

(a) At the national, subregional and regional levels

(i) A ten- to twenty-year long-term plan, depending on the nature of set objectives, which allows for continuing development and the structural changes expected to take place in the economy. Such a plan would deal above all with the main macro-economic components, the priority sectors and to large-scale projects of paramount importance to development at the national, subregional and regional levels. The preparation of a long-term development plan should be based on a structural analysis of realities of the past and of the present and on future prospects;

(ii) The retrospective analysis will attempt to define the development trends observed as well as the mechanisms of this development and among them the conditions for changing the trend. It will also identify the main variables at the source of the trend and other dynamics needed to secure a more accurate picture of the realities;

(iii) The prospective analysis will use its instruments to determine the likely trends in the future on the basis of the critical variables selected. However, since such an analysis can hardly be considered to be foolproof, it should also distinguish between various development scenarios using various hypotheses as to trends and variables, identify the risks and advantages of these hypotheses, to link them to the normative scenarios, taking into account collective preferences for building desirable and credible scenarios. Building scenarios also helps all concerned to improve their view of the situation through the alternative political, economic and social options presented. This could involve the use of set objective models with objective variables, the level and structure of which will be defined on the basis of the objectives of the LPA and the guidelines of AAF-SAP. Perspective studies conducted by ECA and other international organizations could be analysed in this regard and adapted to specific national and subregional frameworks by means of more detailed decennial forecasts using sounder statistical methodologies yet to be prepared.

(b) At the national level:

(i) Four- to five-year medium-term plans which would be so sequenced as to make implementation of the long-term development plan possible and introduce a degree of flexibility in the planning process. The medium-term plan would thus become an instrument for review and updating of the long-term plan and ensure its continuity. It should be more detailed and relate not only to sectors and subsectors but also to various specific planned activities.

(ii) One- to two-year short-term plans which will serve as instruments for implementing for medium- and long-term plans. Such plans should be detailed and precise with regard to the nature and structure of resource allocation to the various sectors, subsectors and projects and make for the systematic integration of financial, economic and social aspects.

44. The principle of the method is therefore to secure policy dominance in the short and medium terms, in other words the dominance of decision-making for long-term development and to subordinate structural adjustment requirements to such development rather than the reverse as is the case in the rolling public investment programmes currently being implemented by many African countries. It also entails the application of long-term guidelines in the use of the technical instruments used in the planning process and short-term programming. It also requires paying special attention to two types of linkages: conformity between specific objectives and the policies for attaining them and conformity of the practical decisions that the policies and objectives cover.

45. Major efforts should therefore be made to ensure that the objectives and policies are clear, precise and detailed in such a way as to establish, right from the commencement stage up to the final phase, the responsible institutions, procedures, implementation time- table and the direct and indirect factors that would help achieve the objective. As such, what is needed for each policy, be it an investment policy or an organization policy, is to estimate the time necessary for its design, implementation and the time frame for the various component activities.

46. In this approach, efforts should be made to ascertain when the effects of a given programme will begin to be felt, in order to secure a better understanding of the linkages between and interdependence of the policies, to appreciate the importance of the sequencing of policy implementation, to substantially improve the monitoring of plan implementation by rationally selecting appropriate monitoring indicators for the various programmes and subprogrammes.

47. A totally effective sequencing of the long, medium and short terms will have been achieved when the detailed policies prove to be in harmony with the objectives and a detailed programming made to outline the sequence of activities in time and when specific decisions match objectives. A major deficiency in African planning will thus have been remedied through the strengthening of financial monitoring, the development of physical follow-up of investment programmes, the monitoring of implementation and the evaluation of the impact of organizational policies aimed at creating an enabling environment. Such monitoring will highlight design deficiencies, the constraints on the pursuit of planned policies and lead to the taking of the necessary remedial measures.

48. Such planning process also enables advantage to be taken of the various technical innovations introduced in planning during the 1970s and 1980s, namely, the rolling triennial investment or public expenditure programmes, priority programmes of action (Senegal), priority areas of intervention (Mali), innovations giving pride of place to selective and normative procedures through hierarchical arrangement of State priorities, and the block programming system (the Congo and Gabon) in which the first block relates to a central nucleus of programmes selected in accordance with their contribution to strategic objectives which should be fairly precise and deemed unchangeable and corresponding to available plan resources, and to operational tranches of decreasing priority the realization of which is contingent on the acquisition of additional resources. With regard to project evaluation, the technique of analysis of the nucleus of the investment programme concentrates on top priority projects, resources for feasibility studies, impact on the environment and the assessment of recurrent expenditure.

49. Studies on project sectors also provide more information than was available prior to the investment decision by taking into consideration all the various stages of the enhancement of the product, of production all the way to final consumption by singling out possible bottlenecks and identifying complementarities between the various operations. This approach which has already been mastered in certain African countries for coffee, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, petroleum, copper, uranium, etc. can, through aggregation, serve as a vital tool for overall planning. However, such innovations should not only be part of a long-term development strategy reflecting effective collective preferences but also should not a priori be subject to the conventional SAPs of the World Bank and IMF as is often the case.

50. Integrating long- medium- and short-term considerations into long-term planning also makes for better use of short-term forecasting techniques, based on the design of adequate models drawn from the social accounting matrices that ECA has tried out in certain countries, within a process that secured the indispensable continuity of planning. Indeed, it is unfortunate that in Africa, the distinction between plan preparation and execution has always created an absurd gap in the planning process: several months of intensive work to bring together planning commissions, prepare the macro-economic framing, choose among programmes and projects and draft a complex document are followed by a latent period devoted at best to monitoring project execution dependent on the acquisition of external financial resources.

(c) Long-term planning requirements

51. Within Africa's current context, the revitalization of long-term development planning requires urgent measures that seek to give national planning systems, solid and legitimate political clout and economic policy instruments which should be efficiently used within an appropriate framework and under adequate institutional conditions.

(d) Political level

52. One important aspect of the long-term development planning process has far more to do with the behaviour, attitude and the reasoning of the economic agents involved in addressing problems relating to the choice of the type of society to be built and the development models, objectives and strategies to be followed together with their economic policy instruments, than with the development of new techniques or establishment of new institutions. The process starts with as comprehensive an assessment of needs and constraints as possible so as to bring out genuine collective preferences that are translated into priorities of a coherent strategy to be used as a normative frame of reference for all development decisions. Such a process is based on genuine political will which means the firm and irreversible commitment of all social strata of the population to the conscious preparation, acceptance and implementation of a development strategy.

53. Such political will gives long-term planning its full meaning and enables the national community to internalize development challenges, and to ensure long-term methodical management based on daily and current experiences. Secondly, thanks to it, planning can become a reliable guide for the nation as a whole and the international community at large, that is to say, all economic and social transactors, households, the private formal sector, public enterprises, the informal sector, subregional co-operation organizations, foreign aid agencies and international organizations. This can only apply if the planning process contributes to perfecting the mechanisms for organizing and establishing genuine democratic dialogue at the national level.

54. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, adopted in Arusha, in February 1990, clearly spelt out the appropriate strategies, modalities and measures to be taken by Governments, the people, youth and workers' organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), voluntary development organizations (VDOs) women's organizations and by the international community, to ensure real participation in development. The approach proposed in this study recommends the immediate introduction of such strategies, modalities and measures in the planning process in order to: (i) reach a consensus on the formulation and application of economic and social policies; (ii) promote the various forms of productive participatory development through the institution of autonomous grass-roots organizations, networking and co-operation among popular organizations and development of the people's ability to formulate and analyse economic development policies, programmes and approaches; (iii) guide technical assistance programmes towards the enhancement of national capabilities in designing, analysing and executing economic reform and development programmes; (iv) encourage the democratization of development by putting the human dimension at the centre of adjustment programmes, which must be compatible with the objectives and aspirations of the peoples of Africa; and (v) increasingly support the NGOs and the VDOs in their recovery and development efforts, as well as initiate and organize popular participation in Africa.

55. The organization of such democratic decision-making should go along with the identification of needs, analysis of interests, the formulation of collective preferences, and the gradual preparation

of an adequate development strategy. The formulation of a development strategy calls for choices which are, at the same time, political, because they deal with ultimate objectives, and technical, because they must take account of constraints. These choices will only be accepted and obligatory if they are based on dialogue throughout the planning process up to when precise and operational decisions are taken. Current practices are quite far from these requirements, especially, if due consideration is given to the disproportionate role played by consultancies and foreign experts in the preparation of plans in Africa.

56. The establishment of such a process requires that the need to plan development be genuinely recognized at the highest level of decision-making. This type of planning can only function when politicians and high-ranking civil servants accept that there are limits to their freedom of action. This is so because the planning discipline, moreover, confines the autonomy of individuals and services to the more general interest of a sound national policy. Without such a commitment, policy-making will lack coherence and may lead to an actual loss of sovereignty since the major economic options will escape the State's control. The utilization of existing national planning capabilities and the building up of national planning potential will, on the contrary, offer a technical basis for sincere dialogue with all agents involved in the planning process.

57. The organization of a democratic decision-making process can be enhanced, largely, by developing the interface and co-ordination systems described above. Furthermore, it will make for solving the major problem encountered, at the moment, in the established planning systems namely, reconciling the two apparently contradictory but essentially interdependent objectives: (a) the need to decentralize, in order to take account of the local potential and constraints and harness the knowledge and energies of the millions in the rural areas into development; (b) the need for central management so as to promote integration at the national level, specialization at the local and regional level as well as the rational management of resources, mostly financial, secured from internal and external sources.

58. The planning process, due to decentralization, will better take charge of the spatial dimension of development through: (a) the organization of the national space as from physical planning schemes; (b) the balanced development of the rural areas through the promotion of more diversified production activities and the establishment of human settlements so as to curb rural exodus through activities likely to influence the movement of people and trade and ensure a more rational use of land, a more equitable distribution of economic, social and cultural activities and revenue; (c) the development of towns in harmony with the development of industry and infrastructures; and (d) the deglobalization of sectoral plans and further decentralization of action programmes.

59. The institution of decentralized planning will, undoubtedly, lead to a review of the role of such central planning agencies as currently exist in most countries. This role will be limited to the co-ordination of local and regional plans, their integration into an overall coherent framework and the management of certain key economic policy instruments. Development guidelines and objectives set forth in national plans must be based, more on a thorough knowledge of the potentials and needs as well as on a better determination of priorities at the local and regional levels. Planning should therefore be considered, above all, as an instrument meant to guide, manage and stimulate economic activities towards a better organization of priorities and coherent policies.

60. The establishment of decentralized planning should also secure more management autonomy and freedom of decision-making, for public enterprises and mass organizations in particular. The

quest for ways and means to take account of the initiatives of the people, decentralized communities, regions and localities expected to meet their own needs through their own means, must be a basic and constant exercise in planning.

61. Within Africa's current circumstances, this type of planning will, obviously, require a fresh distribution of tasks within the State apparatus. Such distribution will include a significant transfer of technical know-how and financial resources to the local and regional levels, including resources meant for the operations and studies of government agencies, and technical planning commissions which conduct all basic planning studies. It may be crucial to establish efficient local development assistance institutions to provide financial, technical and material assistance for decentralized activities as well as prepare staff training and advanced training programmes to meet decentralization requirements.

C. Mastery of economic policy instruments

62. Within Africa's current situation, policy preparation systems should be systematically assessed and a programme of action formulated to improve and strengthen national planning systems and establish planning structures at the subregional level, as a matter of utmost urgency. Such an assessment must deal, particularly, with institutional and organizational capabilities, local planning staff and conditions for the efficient functioning of selected economic instruments for the implementation of a planning process based on AAF-SAP guiding principles.

63. The adoption of an integrated forward-planning process capable of reflecting long-, medium- and short term concerns by integrating financial and realistic variables, presupposes a planning system likely to master any economic policy instruments that govern:

(a) Macro-economic balance and control of public spending:

(i) Income and expenditure budget: implementation of fiscal and public spending policy adapted to plan objectives;

(ii) Money supply and loans: policies on the sectoral allocation of loans to be granted in priority sectors, adoption of selective interest rates, establishment of a fund for lending at subsidized rates to certain groups of operators, intra-African monetary co-operation, etc.;

(iii) Distribution of foreign aid, pursuant to objectives and priorities of the plan;

(iv) Regulation of foreign borrowing: limiting of debt service ratios, channelling borrowed money into plan objective and priority areas, etc.;

(v) Exchange rate and exchange control: rational use of de facto multiple exchange rates and/or establishment and streamlining of such a system so as to transfer and mobilize resources, stop capital flight and ensure the availability of essential imported products.

(b) System to encourage efficient resource allocation:

(i) Adoption of investment codes and procedures so as to promote local small-scale industries, modernize agriculture, animal husbandry and the informal sector;

(ii) Regulation and orientation of foreign investment to conform with priorities of the plan;

(iii) Control over public enterprises (choice of technologies, determination of production costs, employment and training policies, production programmes, etc.);

(iv) Pricing policy, especially, for agricultural products and other essential goods and exercise of control over them;

(v) Selective policy to subsidize prices in order to increase the local supply of essential goods;

(vi) Policies on public service employments and salaries in conformity with objectives of the plan;

(vii) Fiscal policies in favour of long-term development;

viii) Review of policies relating to customs duty, import quotas, taxes and export subsidies in order to accelerate the integration of African economies;

(ix) Policies on import licences oriented towards priorities of the plan; transport policies geared towards the development of intra-African trade.

(c) Institutional and local manpower development - quality control instruments:

(i) Land and agrarian reforms policy giving increased access and right to land as well as land ownership;

(ii) Scientific and agricultural research policies reflecting the priority objectives of the plan;

(iii) Educational and training policy in line with long-term economic development objectives;

(iv) Policies to rehabilitate and rationalize production capabilities and infrastructures;

(v) Physical planning policies for fairly balanced spatial development liable to curb rural-urban drift and the growth of cities;

(vi) Population policies in relation to development objectives;

(vii) Popular participation in the planning process - organization and modalities;

(viii) Legal infrastructure: formulation of precise legislation on the participation of various economic and social groups such as rural co-operatives, craftsmen-traders;

(ix) Establishment of rural institutions to encourage cottage and home industries with emphasis on indigenous technology, domestic financing, rural infrastructure and women's participation; community development institutions, particularly, local NGOs and self-help programmes.

64. Certain specific instruments for the follow-up of popular participation identified within the African Charter on Popular Participation such as:

(a) Political accountability of leaders at all levels for the results and progress of planned activities;

(b) Decentralization and democratization of decision-making processes and institutions;

(c) Press and media freedom in order to facilitate public debate on major issues;

(d) Rule of law, social and economic justice;

(e) Protection of the ecological and human environment;

(f) Establishment of a co-ordinated planning system that controls all the economic policy instruments for selected plan implementation.

65. Planning must basically address the examination and selection, depending on the special situation of each country and subregion of major policy instruments (which must be given their proper place, within a given time frame) from the list of instruments proposed earlier along with other instruments deemed useful after prior analysis of the substantive tasks to be performed. At the national and subregional levels, an organizational framework in terms of the essential instruments chosen for the execution of plans should be worked out and the staff necessary to make these structures function identified, selected and organized.

C. Establishment of a basic information system

66. A programme for the recovery of long-term planning potential must give priority to the improvement of basic data, without which proper analysis of economic policy cannot be conducted. Indeed, the deficiency in the system of data on African economies is well known: data describing the official economic system give an incomplete and inaccurate picture of real economic activity. Available data have always poorly appraised subsistence activities in the rural area, sales of local foods and the non-structured urban sector. With the upsurge of the crisis, the parallel economy is booming but, a growing number of activities escape the control of official circles and business is transacted at prices very different from those officially approved. Black market foreign currency operations compete with the volume of official exchange transactions; articles subject to price control are sold to consumers at prices several times higher; huge quantities of goods enter and leave the countries illegally; and State property is used for private economic activities.

67. Apart from finding out whether all these parallel economic activities are advisable or not, it is clear that any economic analysis that fails to consider them is incomplete. The immediate thing to do is to determine core formal definitions of a minimum data system for planning, in terms of set short- medium- and long-term objectives.

68. Within the implementation of development objectives such as those recommended by LPA and AAF-SAP, such an information system would, necessarily, include:

(a) Main elements of a standard national accounting system established each year (with an input-output table, updated, for instance, every five years);

(b) Estimates of real income and expenditure of households per sector and per social group;

(c) Complete agricultural data on the main foodstuffs and export crops produced;

(d) Industrial statistics, principally, production, use of capacities, costs and input-output correlations;

(e) Social statistics: education, health, nutrition, housing, employment, unemployment and satisfaction of basic needs;

(f) Budgetary data, with expenditure presented if possible in a manner that can be analysed according to its economic function and its distribution per ministry;

(g) Data on the balance of payments, external debt and money supply;

(h) Basic economic documents comprising feasibility studies on sectoral activities, project execution reports, all sectoral studies likely to lead to a better understanding of national, subregional and regional economic activity and development prospects.

69. In conclusion, the three basic requirements for restoration of long-term planning as earlier mentioned must be met if the errors of the past are to be avoided. The region can respond by rationally using established planning capacities; strengthening statistical systems at the national, subregional and regional levels; establishing economic policy instruments and adequate institutional structures at the national and subregional levels; and upgrading available human resources, especially, the technical staff, in the area of planning and statistics. The perspective studies already conducted by ECA could serve as a basis for long-term subregional planning which would constitute a reference framework for the harmonization and integration of national plans. Training institutions funded by the Commission can also contribute to the enhancement and development of the African technical skills needed for decentralized planning.

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9-13 May 1991

MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING AND MONITORING THE AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION

M91-549

I. BACKGROUND AND MANDATE OF THE CHARTER

1. The crisis that engulfed the African continent in the 1980s was not only an economic crisis but also a human, legal, political and social crisis. In the wake of such a crisis, suffering, hardship and impoverishment of the vast majority of African people increased at an alarming rate. At the same time, the political situation in Africa was characterized by an over-centralized power structure which further impeded the participation of the vast majority of the population in social, political and economic development. With such a dismal picture, ECA, with collaborative efforts from the African peoples' organizations, African Governments, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, organized an International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, in February 1990.

2. The ECA Conference of Ministers responsible for Economic Development and Planning, at its twenty-fourth session, adopted resolution 664 (XXIV) which supported convening a conference on popular participation and urged African Governments to actively participate in it. The Conference was organized under the auspices of the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on the Follow-up on the Implementation of the UN-PAAERD at the regional level (UN-IATF) and with the full support of the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

3. The Conference was the third in a series of international conferences organized by ECA in collaboration with other United Nations agencies in contribution to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD). It followed the Abuja International Conference on Africa: The Challenge of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development, held in 1987, and the 1988 Khartoum International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development.

4. With the theme of "putting the people first", the objectives of the Conference were to: 2/

(a) Recognize the role of peoples' participation in Africa's recovery and development efforts;

(b) Sensitize national governments and the international community to the dimensions, dynamics, processes and potential of a development approach rooted in popular initiatives and self-reliant efforts;

(c) Identify obstacles to people's participation in development and define appropriate approaches to the promotion of popular participation in policy formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes;

(d) Recommend actions to be taken by governments, the United Nations system and donor agencies in building an enabling environment for the authentic popular participation in the development process and encourage people and their organizations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives;

(e) Facilitate the exchange of information, experience and knowledge for mutual support among people and their organizations; and

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1/ ECA, E/ECA/CM.16/11, African Charter for Popular Participation, International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, 12-16 February, 1990, p. 17.

2/ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

(f) Propose indicators for monitoring progress in facilitating people's participation in Africa's development.

5. The Conference defined popular participation as

> ... the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interest of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits. Therefore, there must be an opening up of political process to accommodate freedom of opinions, tolerate differences, accept consensus on issues as well as to ensure the effective participation of the people and their organizations and associations.

It affirmed that nations cannot be built without the popular support and participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people. The concept of development from below was, once again brought to the fore of development issues at the Conference.

6. Human-centred development which ensures the overall well-being of the people through sustained improvement in their living standards and the full and effective participation of the people in determining their development policies, programmes and processes and contributing to their realization were emphasized. The marginalization and subordination of Africa in world affairs, both geo-politically and economically, was deplored by the Conference.

7. To graduate from the inherent economic crises which characterize Africa, the Conference urged African Governments and policy-makers to urgently embark upon the task of transforming the structure of the national economies to achieve long-term self-sustained growth and development that is both human-centred and participatory in nature. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) was endorsed by the Conference as a blue-print for transforming African economies to attain long-term self-sustaining economic growth and development.

8. The mandate for the Charter for Popular Participation revolves around resolution 691 (XXV) of the ECA Conference of Ministers which adopted and endorsed the Charter. The ECA Conference of Ministers further asked the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania to submit the Charter to the twenty-sixth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and to the forty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly.

9. The Charter was adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers in July 1990 in resolution CM/RES/1286(LII) and was subsequently endorsed by the Summit of Heads of State and Government in its Declaration. The resolution adopted the Charter as a

> statement of the strategy that should be incorporated in development policies adopted by African Governments with a view to promoting popular participation in development and by encouraging people and their organizations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives.

The resolution further requested the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Executive Secretary of ECA to set up a mechanism for implementing and monitoring the follow-up activities.

10. The General Assembly in resolution 45/178 (C) took note with appreciation of the Charter; commended the collective commitment of African peoples and Governments to promote economic recovery and development in Africa through, inter alia, popular participation for development and transformation; and

called upon the international community to increase support to Africa's efforts in bringing about sustained and sustainable growth and development taking into account, inter alia, the objectives of the Charter.

11. The full texts of the above resolutions and Declaration of the African Heads of State and Government of the OAU are given in the annex.

II. IMPLEMENTING THE CHARTER

12. In accordance with paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Charter, monitoring of its implementation at the Africa regional level will be done by ECA and the OAU through the Regional Advisory Group (RAG). RAG will be submitting biennial progress reports on the implementation of the Charter to the ECA Conference of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. In addition to ECA and the OAU, representatives of governments, trade unions, women's organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), voluntary development organizations (VDOs) and grass-roots, youth and student organizations will form part of RAG. The establishment of RAG will, therefore, require the blessing of all these bodies.

13. At the national level, it is envisaged that implementation of the Charter will monitored through national conferences, such as the one recently held in Arusha from 3 to 8 March 1991. Through such national conferences, grass-roots peoples organizations can network and exchange ideas and experiences on the progress and problems encountered in implementing the Charter. Such a follow-up mechanism would allow representatives of governments, trade unions, women's organizations, NGOs, VDOs, grass-roots and youth and student organizations to exchange their experiences and share ideas.

14. In addition, ECA is setting up a "focal point" project to facilitate the implementation of the Charter. The project will be based in the Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division. In collaboration with NGO networks, trade unions, VDOs, peoples organizations and African Governments, the project will assist in organizing meetings, with the objective of creating national consultative mechanisms to foster the participation of people and their organizations in the planning and implementation of national development strategies. It will thus support initiatives which strengthen and encourage the building of independent and democratic networks of NGOs and grass-roots organizations throughout Africa.

15. The project will also publish a newsletter and investigate the possibilities for electronic communication links so as to document grass-root experiences and initiatives in the development process and as a way of enhancing human resources development and technical cooperation at the grass-roots level.

16. Further, the project will prepare studies on issues concerned with building an enabling environment for the growth of popular participation.

17. On another front, ECA, through the Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division, is trying to establish another project "Promoting popular participation in development in Africa: With special emphasis on environment and sustainable development". This project is scheduled to last for two years. The long-term objective of the project is to promote sustainable development in two African countries through environmentally sound development planning. The main activity of the project will, therefore, be the promotion of environmental management for sustainable development through popular participation.

18. The main objectives of the project, briefly, are as follows:

(a) Building the capacity of the grass-roots and people's organizations to understand environmental issues and the environmental impact of development activities;

(b) Enable the people and their organizations to interact with the government on environmental matters;

(c) Strengthen the capacity of people's organizations to mount public information campaigns, monitor environmental developments and issues and to contribute to policies and plans as related to the environment;

(d) Provide expertise and documentation on relevant environmental issues; and

(e) Assist people's organizations in the two countries to cooperate and exchange information on aspects related to environment and development.

III. CONCLUSION

19. ECA considers the initiatives outlined above as essential in monitoring and implementing the Charter. But like any new idea, the concept of popular participation, if it is ever going to be a permanent feature of development planning in Africa, has to be embraced and supported by African Governments, trade unions, NGOs, peoples' organizations, etc. The economic and social turmoil which characterize Africa at the moment can only be reversed if the concept of popular participation and its central theme of human-centred development are adopted by development planners, politicians, NGOs, grass-roots organizations and the like. It is not too late to reverse Africa's fortunes.

Annex

RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION

Resolution 691 (XXV). THE AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION

The ECA Conference of Ministers,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution S-13/2 on the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD),

Recalling also resolution 664 (XXIV) of the twenty-fourth session of the Commission and fifteenth meeting of the Conference of Ministers on the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa,

Aware of the fact that people have a fundamental right to participate fully in the making of policy decisions which affect their lives at all levels,

Noting with interest the decisions and recommendations arrived at by the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, held from 12 to 16 February 1990 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, and in particular resolution 2 of the same name whose operative paragraphs resolve, inter alia, that the eleventh day of February each year should be proclaimed Popular Participation Day in Africa,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for generously hosting the Conference;

2. Adopts the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha 1990) as a statement of the strategy that should be incorporated in development policies adopted by African Governments with a view to promoting popular participation in development and by encouraging people and their organizations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives;

3. Recommends that the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania should submit the present Charter to the forty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the fifty-second session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU and twenty-sixth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU;

4. Requests the Executive Secretary of ECA and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to disseminate the contents of the Charter widely, and to set up a mechanism for implementing and monitoring the follow up of activities contained in the Charter at sub-regional and regional levels and submit regular annual reports to the ECA Conference of Ministers and the appropriate organs of the Organization of African Unity.

Resolution CM/Res.1286(L11) RESOLUTION ON THE AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION 3/

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its 52nd Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 3 to 7 July 1990,

Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution S-13/2 on the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD),

Recalling also resolution 664 (XXIV) of the twenty-fourth session of the Commission and fifteenth meeting of the Conference of Ministers on the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa,

Aware of the fact that people have a fundamental right to participate fully in the making of policy decisions which affect their lives at all levels,

Noting with interest the decision and recommendations arrived at by the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, held from 12 to 16 February 1990 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, and in particular resolution 2 of the same name whose operative paragraphs resolve, inter alia, that the eleventh day of February each year should be proclaimed Popular Participation Day in Africa:

1. EXPRESSES its appreciation to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for generously hosting the Conference;

2. ADOPTS the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha 1990) as a statement of the strategy that should be incorporated in development policies adopted by African Governments with a view to promoting popular participation in development and by encouraging people and their organizations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives;

3. RECOMMENDS that the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania should submit the present Charter to the forty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations for its information and necessary action;

4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Executive Secretary of ECA to disseminate the contents of the Charter widely, and to set up a mechanism for implementing and monitoring the follow-up of activities contained in the Charter at subregional and regional levels and submit regular annual reports to the Council.

3/ Ghana and Gabon entered reservations on this resolution.

DECLARATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN AFRICA AND THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE WORLD

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at the Twenty-sixth Ordinary Session of our Assembly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 9 - 11 July 1990, have undertaken a critical review of the political, social and economic situation of our continent in the light of the rapid changes taking place in the world and their impact on Africa as presented in the Report of the Secretary General on the fundamental changes taking place in the world and their implications for Africa: Proposals for an African Response.

2. In particular, we have noted the changing East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation, the socio-economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, the steady move towards political and monetary union of Western Europe, the increasing global tendency towards regional integration and the establishment of trading and economic blocs as well as the advances in science and technology. These we found constitute major factors which should guide Africa's collective thinking about the challenges and options before her in the 1990s and beyond in view of the real threat of marginalization of our continent.

3. We noted with satisfaction, the achievements of Africa in the struggle for the decolonization of the continent and in the fight against racism and apartheid; as well as the positive role played by the OAU in this respect. The independence of Namibia has pushed further Africa's frontiers of freedom.

4. We took note of the measures taken by Mr. de Klerk which provide ground for optimism. We caution however, that these changes fall far short of our common objective of totally dismantling Apartheid. Unless and until the Racist Minority Government is irreversibly committed to the eradication of this anachronistic system, the International Community must continue to exert all forms of pressure including in particular, economic sanctions against South Africa. This, our collective view, is also the demand of the National Liberation Movements of that country. We wish at the same time to reaffirm our solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and to assure them of our undivided support at this crucial phase in their struggle. At the same time, we urge them to close their ranks and unite their forces.

5. The socio-economic situation in our continent remains precarious today despite the many efforts made by our countries, individually and collectively. At our Second Extra-ordinary Assembly in Lagos - Nigeria in April 1980, we adopted the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa up to the year 2000 and the Final Act of Lagos. At the Twenty-first Ordinary Session of our Assembly held here in Addis Ababa in July 1985, we also adopted the Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986 - 1990. Equally, in the face of the excruciating external debt burden, we convened the Third Extra-ordinary Session of our Assembly and adopted the African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis. In all these endeavours, we were guided by the principle of collective self-reliance and self-sustaining development.

6. These represented our collective attempt to institute measures to arrest and reverse the steady decline in Africa's economic performance. Despite these attempts and strong political commitment to them, it has not so far been possible to achieve our objective of laying a firm foundation for self-sustained development of our countries. On the contrary, throughout the decade of the 1980s most of our productive and infrastructural facilities continued to deteriorate. The per capita incomes of our peoples fell drastically and so did the volumes of our exports as well as imports. There has been sharp decline in the quality of life in our countries as spending on public health, housing and education and other social services had to be severely curtailed. Food production has also fallen in proportion to the expanding population. All this contrasted sharply with the alarming rise in Africa's external debt stock which shot up from about 50 billion

US Dollars in 1980 to about 257 billion US Dollars by the end of 1989. As a result of this combination of acute economic problems and external indebtedness, the number of African Member States classified as least developed rose from 21 to 28 during the same period.

7. Our countries have made serious efforts to cope with the most adverse consequences of this difficult economic situation. Most of our countries have entered into structural adjustment programmes with the international financial and monetary institutions - mostly at heavy political and social costs. But we realize that these are short term measures and are by themselves insufficient to completely restore our economies to sound footing and lay firm foundation for future growth. We are very much concerned that, in addition to these problems, there is an increasing tendency to impose conditionalities of a political nature for assistance to Africa.

8. We reaffirm that Africa's development is the responsibility of our governments and peoples. We are now more than before determined to lay a solid foundation for self-reliant, human-centred and sustainable development on the basis of social justice and collective self-reliance so as to achieve accelerated structural transformation of our economies. Within this context we are determined to work assiduously towards economic integration through regional cooperation. We are also determined to take urgent measures to rationalize the existing economic groupings in our continent in order to increase their effectiveness in promoting economic integration and establishing an African Economic Community.

9. These are objectives we set for ourselves in Lagos in 1980. We reaffirm their continued validity as well as the fundamental principles of the Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, including the sectoral priorities contained in them in particular , the urgent need to attain self-sufficiency in food production, to promote science and technology for development and to establish a viable industrial base on the continent. In this context, we commit ourselves to the pursuit of sound population and environmental policies conducive to economic growth and development of our continent.

10. We are fully aware that in order to facilitate this process of socio-economic transformation and integration, it is necessary to promote popular participation of our peoples in the processes of government and development. A political environment which guarantees human rights and the observance of the rule of law, would assure high standards of probity and accountability particularly on the part of those who hold public office. In addition, popular-based political processes would ensure the involvement of all including, in particular, women and youth in the development efforts. We accordingly recommit ourselves to the further democratization of our societies and to the consolidation of democratic institutions in our countries. We reaffirm the right of our countries to determine, in all sovereignty, their system of democracy on the basis of their socio-cultural values, taking into account the realities of each of our countries and the necessity to ensure development and satisfy the basic needs of our peoples. We therefore assert that democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing.

11. We realize at the same time that the possibilities of achieving the objectives we have set will be constrained as long as an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability does not prevail in Africa. We therefore renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts on our continent. The resolution of conflicts will be conducive to the creation of peace and stability in the continent and will also have the effect of reducing expenditures on defence and security thus releasing additional resources for socio-economic development. We are equally determined to make renewed efforts to eradicate the root causes of the refugee problem. It is only through the creation of stable conditions that Africa can fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development.

12. At this crucial juncture when our continent is emerging with difficulty from a phase in its history that focused mainly on political liberation and nation building, and is about to embark on a new era laying greater emphasis on economic development, we need to strengthen the Organization of African Unity so that it may also become a viable instrument in the service of Africa's economic development and integration.

Consistent with this goal, we rededicate ourselves to the principles and objectives enshrined in its Charter; to our faith in ourselves and to our continent, with greater determination to be masters of our destiny. In this spirit, we reaffirm our commitment to revive the ideals of Pan-Africanism and commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples to maintain and strengthen our unity and solidarity and to pool our resources and wisdom in order to face the challenges of the decade of the 1990s and beyond, change the bleak socio-economic prospects of our continent and guarantee a better life for all peoples and future generations yet unborn. These objectives are well within our capabilities. We, therefore, pledge to apply ourselves fully to the achievement of these objectives.

13. The achievement of these objectives will also require international cooperation and solidarity, as well as fundamental changes in the international economic system. The continuing plummeting of the prices of Africa's commodities, skyrocketing of prices of manufactured goods and the growing burden of external debt and the attendant reverse flow of resources constitute external factors which severely constrain our efforts for economic recovery. The developed countries bear a major responsibility for the transformation of the present inequitable international system. On our part, we will continue to strive for the establishment of a just and equitable international economic system. In this connection, a revitalized Non-Aligned Movement can play a decisive role.

14. We recommit ourselves to strengthen the South-South Cooperation and to play a lead role in this regard. We also wish to express our readiness to work in concert with other countries and regions of the developing world to reactivate North-South dialogue and cooperation. We do believe that an increasingly interdependent world calls for greater international solidarity and that peace and prosperity should be shared for the common good of humanity.

15. We request the Secretary General to monitor the implementation of this declaration and to take all necessary actions in this respect in collaboration with the ECA, ADB and other African and International Institutions. We also request him to ensure the widest possible dissemination of this declaration and to sensitize African public opinion and the International Community on its content.

Addis Ababa - Ethiopia
11 July 1990

Resolution 45/178 (C) AFRICAN CHARTER FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions S-13/2 of 1 June 1986 on the critical economic situation in Africa, the annex to which contains the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990, 43/12 of 25 October 1988, 43/27 of 18 November 1988 on mid-term review and appraisal of the Programme of Action and 44/24 of 17 November 1989 on the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation, which, inter alia, called for popular participation in the activities for growth and development.

Noting with interest the concepts contained in the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, 4/ the importance of which has been recognized in international conferences,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation; 5/

2. Commends the collective commitment of African peoples and Governments to promote economic recovery and development in Africa through, inter alia, popular participation for development and transformation;

3. Calls upon the international community to increase support to Africa's efforts in bringing about sustained and sustainable growth and development taking into account, inter alia, the objectives of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation.

4/ A/44/315, annex.

5/ Ibid.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPARENT IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES (SAPs) ON POPULATION

E91-336

INTRODUCTION

1. As a consequence of several factors, the last three decades have witnessed a deterioration of socio-economic conditions in many African countries. Among the internal factors are: (a) the persistent differentials in incomes between rural and urban areas as well as the relative neglect of the former; (b) the establishment of a few large-scale manufacturing industries and widespread application of import substitution strategy based on capital technologies that do not address problems of employment and labour absorption; (c) delayed demographic transition; and (d) unstable political structures. On the other hand, the exogenous factors include: (a) the hostile external economic environment; (b) persistent decline in world prices of primary commodities (eg. fluctuations in cost of oil and other manufactured goods; (c) servicing of heavy debts; and, (d) frequent droughts (Adedeji, 1990).

2. Concommitantly, rapid population growth rates became a phenomenon of developing countries since world war II, as a result of rapid declines in mortality and a lag in fertility declines. Despite policies aimed at controlling population growth rates, these remained high in Africa and resulted in using more and more resources to provide basic growing needs of the population instead of investing them in the productive sector and in the provision of development related infrastructure. Accordingly, in the 1980s, development strategies laid greater emphasis on people's participation in the development process simultaneous with mobilization of community resources and self-reliance to provide for the basic needs at the community level. Essentially, an integrated approach to population and development planning has been much popularized since the dawn of the 1980s. It is suggested that by 'endogenizing' population factors in the development planning process, sustainable development can be achieved.

3. In the 1980s economic policy in developing countries was largely dominated by the need to adjust to serious balance of payments problems. Traditional project lending for balance of payments support was then the preserve of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Lending in support of a programme to cope with a balance of payments crisis was launched by the World Bank in 1980. Initially these structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), expected to be short lived, were limited to the task of achieving macro-economic balances; they involved the adoption of policies to enhance economic efficiency, promote growth and ensure that resources are allocated according to the free play of market forces. The earlier SAPs were thus committed to achieving stabilization and growth objectives, and tended to concentrate on the economic dimension of development thereby marginalizing the social and human dimensions in development (UNECA, 1988; UNICEF, 1990a).

4. By 1984, 30 developing countries with external payments difficulties had received adjustment loans from the World Bank. Of these six (Cote D'Ivoire, 1981; Kenya, 1980; Malawi, 1981; Mauritius, 1981; Senegal, 1980; and Togo, 1983) were in Africa. As at 1987, 12 other African countries had received similar loans (See Table 1). As the experience with this type of lending accumulated during the 1980s and the complexities of the adjustment process became apparent in a large number of country experiences, SAPs came to encompass a far broader range of policy areas than balance of payments and price stability. The additional concerns had to do with the time frame, sustainability and long term growth and development; these were incorporated into the discussions and negotiations over the design of country-specific adjustment programmes. The critical element was how much room for manoeuver governments had in maintaining their fiscal deficits (United Nations, 1991).

5. Orthodox SAPs assumed that "the classical instruments of control namely money supply, credit squeeze, exchange rate and interest rate adjustments, trade liberalization (which may be valid in well-structured economies) could bring about positive results in African economies that are characterized by weak and disarticulate structures" (UNECA, 1989a). Evaluation reports however, show that in many African countries with orthodox SAPS, sustained economic growth has not materialized (Azon and Adjounhonoun, 1990; Basse, 1990; Chander, 1990; Isamah, 1990; Tungaraza, 1990; and Twumasi, 1990). Rather the rate of investment has tended to decrease; budget and balance of payments deficits have tended to widen after some temporary relief; and, debt service obligations have become unbearable. In effect, the application of orthodox SAPs have partially contributed to significantly exercerbate the economic crisis and have made recovery more difficult by undermining the social and political cohesion of African countries; the declining of per capita income and real wages; the rising of poverty levels and income inequalities; and, the contraction in and deterioration of the social sectors particularly employment, education and health.

6. Against this background, the long- and short- term measures of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), formulated in 1980, was designed to alleviate mass poverty and improve the living standards of Africans. Since 1983, when available social indicators started to show negative consequences of SAPs in many developing countries, UNICEF has been in the fore front in advocating "adjustment with a human face" (UNICEF 1990a). Such adjustments include the need for measures to protect the poor and vulnerable groups; investment to help small scale farmers, traders, women producers; and investment in education , health and employment creation activities to alleviate the unemployment situation.

7. In 1984, at the Second African Population Conference, the Kilimanjaro Programme of Action on Population (KPA) was adopted. This indicated that population should be a central component in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes for socio-economic development plans. Alongside with the KPA, both Africa's Priority Programme of Action for Economic Recovery, (APPER) 1986-1990 and the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD), 1986-1990 were intended to lay foundation for alleviating the effects of the economic crisis. These could not neutralize the pressure from external factors that have insisted on acceptance of SAPs in order to get external assistance.

8. Indeed government expenditures as a share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) continued to decline almost everywhere in indebted developing countries in the 1980s. Forced with the need to reduce these expenditures, governments concentrated cuts more heavily on public investment on the provision of health care, education, housing, safe water supply, sanitation, employment these affected the well-being of the populations involved. Together with other elements of the SAPs, living standards of households were affected in different ways and intensity.

9. A critical observation regarding these various development oriented frameworks (ie. LPA, APPER and UN-PAAERD) is that each of them was designed to address a particular issue; none of these issues was considered alongside with population - the ultimate beneficiary of development goals. Little wonder then, available evidence from various studies have shown that implementation of the conventional SAPs has not brought about the desired results in reducing the adverse consequences of the economic crisis on the African people.

10. In order to forestall this shortcoming and as the gravity of the economic situation in African countries continued unabated, the third meeting of the United Nations Steering Committee on follow-up on the UN-PAAERD decided on the convening of a major international conference in

Africa on the human dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery and Development which took place in Khartoum, Sudan, 5-8 March 1988 (UNECA, 1988). The Khartoum meeting noted the severity of SAPs on millions of people in many African countries implementing them since such programmes are incomplete, mechanistic and have a shortime perspective during which the various problems cannot be resolved. The thrust of the Khartoum Conference was to place the social dimension at the centre of SAPs and to stress that the latter should complement government efforts to attain long-term socio-economic development goals.

11. The recognition by the IMF and the World Bank of the adverse problems of SAPs is reflected in the initiation in 1987 by the African Development Bank, UNDP and the World Bank of the Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA) programmes to address the difficulties occasioned by SAPs. Whereas SAPs have different effects on different population groups within the society, SDA aims at identifying the type and extent of effects on the various groups (the poorest groups) with an objective of protecting them and integrating these groups into the main economic stream (ADB; UNDP; World Bank, 1990). For example in Cameroon, SDA programmes are supporting health care, family planning, education, employment, women in development and community development programmes.

12. A substantial emphasis of SDA has been put on obtaining an adequate data base to assess the social impact of adjustment programmes on the vulnerable groups as well as to identify target groups for projection (United Nations, 1991). Consequently, the data in several areas of statistics have become available much sooner than would otherwise. In some cases, innovative approaches to data collection have been attempted. For instance, customs registers were changed in some countries to obtain up-to-date economic statistics relating to foreign trade as well as to help project the external debt burden. Additionally, developing countries have been requested (by international organizations) to gather additional statistics that could permit an assessment of the social consequences of the adjustment programmes.

13. Unfortunately, these developments sometimes appeared to be at the expense of permanent surveys of production, services and household surveys. This is one aspect of the negative side of SDA programmes; there are other aspects. It is suggested that SDA's "treatment of the economics of adjustment is quite conventional and its attempted innovation to link these analytically with the issue of the welfare of individuals (or households) misleads it to overstress the importance of household survey as the sole instrument for action-oriented research" (UNDP, 1990b). More fundamentally, by ignoring its predecessors 'in the area of poverty' (eg. UNDP - Human Development Report; and, UNICEF - Adjustment with a Human face), SDA has failed to capitalize on these earlier contributions in order to focus on the institutional, managerial, organizational and administrative aspects which together, constitute the prerequisites for any successful intervenist policies. Given the fragility of public administration in most African countries, this is a serious limitation. Indeed, "its lack of clear focus, its single minded adherence to one tool of empirical research as well as its total neglect of institutional issues and of delivery systems greatly curtail its value to African governments (UNDP, 1990b). Details of the merits and demerits of SDA programmes are contained in an interim evaluation report prepared for the 1990 UNDP Governing Council.

14. In the face of the limitations of SAPs and SDAs, the challenge still facing African governments is to explore ways by which new and innovative studies can be made in attaining social development goals while using poverty sensitive adjustment policies to establish a broad based and sustainable economic growth path. Operational and programmatic realities have not been

overly successful in the integration of economic and social sectors. It was out of recognition of the serious problems arising from SAPs (and subsequent SDAs) that ECA started in 1988 to develop a framework that would address those problems; the framework, known as the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF- SAP), was adopted by African Ministers of Economic Planning and Development and Ministers of Finance in 1989. At the centre of AAF- SAP is the human dimension. Basically AAF-SAP comprises (a) a macro-economic framework; (a) policy directions and measures; and, (c) implementation strategies (or policy instruments). Together these components take into account the dynamic relationships among all major elements related to the ideal adjustment with transformation in African economies. It is hoped that the resulting holistic structure could eliminate the dichotomy between structural adjustment and long-term development that is peculiar to SAPs (UNECA, 1989a).

15. The main thrust of AAF-SAP is the elimination of the indicated bottlenecks from SAPs in order to provide needed 'enabling environment' that would foster sustainable developement of African countries. In this context, it is to be stressed that AAF-SAP is not a development programme to be applied in all countries. Rather, it is a framework that is designed to aid the formulation and implementation of specific country development programmes; it is particularly useful for selecting appropriate development policy instruments and measures. As a human-centred framework, it implies full democritization of all aspects of economic and social activities and calls for intensified inter-country co-operation in the designing, implementing and monitoring of national development programmes.

16. From the foregoing outline on AAF-SAP, however, no specific provision has yet been provided for population within the framework. Indeed, to date, only three policy instruments have been proposed, namely the use of multiple exchange rate system (UNECA, 1990b), differential interest rate policy (UNECA, 1990c) and agricultural production subsidies (UNECA, 1990d). The 'endogenization' of population variables in the development planning process is being suggested at this point as an additional policy instrument of AAF-SAP.

17. The main focus of this paper is to provide a framework within which this 'endogenization' process can form an integral part of AAF-SAP. In this context, it is pertinent to first assess the impact of SAPs on various population growth components in the region. The essence of such an assessment is to identify critical aspects of population growth component that could be integrated into the AAF-SAP framework while evolving national population programmes (NPPs) as integral parts of over-all national development programmes. It is hoped that by stressing such factors, the NPPs could ensure the success of population policies in redressing rapid population growth in the region. The assessment is attempted in section two. In section three, the elements of the population related remedial strategies to be incorporated into AAF-SAP are presented to ensure the achievement of sustainable development in the region.

I. IMPACT OF SAPs

18. In order to establish the impact of SAPs on population among African countries, certain population variables are selected for consideration, depending on availability of data. Two periods are considered : the preadjustment period, from say 1965 to 1980, when most African countries did not take part in the implementation of SAPs, and the period since 1980, when almost all African countries were implementing; this therefore is the post adjustment programme period. The two periods are strictly not comparable even in terms of duration. The initiation of SAPs (ie. the starting year) and duration (in terms of intensify) also differ from one country to another (See Table

l). In particular, the pre-SAP period comprises an earlier boom era (1965-75) for most African countries and the onset of economic decline (from 1975 on wards). Additionally, the relationship between SAPs and population related variables is more implicit than explicit; this tends to constrain adequate appreciation of the resulting analysis. There is also the problem of ascertaining the extent (if any) to which the country has actually operationalized the implementation of the adjustment programme following putting in place, either "structural adjustment arrangements" or "stand-by arrangements" or "World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans" (See Table l). Accordingly, the data examined here are exploratory at this stage. With time, when more firm data become available, the impact of SAPs in this context would be ascertained with greater confidence.

19. Average annual growth rate (%) in per capita GNP (AGNPC=X_1) is used as a proxy for an index of a nation's economic performance. To the extent that SAPs have several objectives (eg.alleviation of balance of payments problems, effecting economic stability, ensuring long term growth and development, etc.), the use of one index to measure the various impacts of these objectives is more for convenience than is analytically desirable. About six population variables related to AGNPC are selected. These are (a) average annual reduction rate in the under 5 mortality rate (U5MRAARR=X_2). This measures the end result of the development process and has been chosen by UNICEF as its single most important indicator of the state of a nation's children (UNICEF, 1990). When used in relation to AGNPC, this index gives a picture of the progress being made by a country towards the satisfaction of the most essential of human needs; (b) average annual rate of reduction in the total fertility rate (TFRAARR=X_3). This is used as a proxy for average family size (i.e., average number of children ever born); (c) average annual growth rate (per cent) of the urban population (UPOPAAGR=X_4). This is used in place of the more approriate level of urbanization which is normally better associated with modernization; (d) daily per capita calorie supply as per cent of requirements (DPCCALS=X_5); (e) average index of food production per capita (PCAIFPROD=X_6); and, (f) per cent of age group enrolled in primary school (PRIENROL=X_7).

20. In Table 2, data on all seven variables as compiled by UNICEF in its '1990 state of the children report' are presented for 36 African Countries reported by the ECA Secretriat (l989b) as having SAPs. Of these, only 28 countries have data in respect of all the seven variables. In the UNICEF study under reference, a justification was provided for the inclusion of all the variables in its study. However, there is need for caution in using the selected seven variables here in assessing the impact of SAPs on population in the African region. For one thing, these are secondary data given a different study orientation. Additionally, and as noted in the UNICEF study, much of the data are official government estimates received by the responsible United Nations agency; where no such reliable figures could be obtained, available estimates made by the responsible United Nations agency have been used. For instance, most of the under-5 mortality estimates are interpolations based on 5-year estimates prepared by United Nations Population Division (New York). The annual per capita gross national product are annual average growth rates computed by fitting trend lines to the logarithmic values of GNP per capita at constant market prices for each year of the time period.

2l. Analytically, each of these seven sets of data is considered in turn at the two time periods in the pre-SAP (t_1) and post-SAP (t_2) periods using the non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed Ranks Test. This provides a useful technique for making judgement of 'greater than' between any pair's two performances. The results of necessary computations for the 28 countries with complete data are summarized in Table 3. From first principles, the null hypothesis in each of the seven cases is that there is no difference between the estimates for the pre- and post-SAP

periods. Against this, is the alternative research hypothesis which varies for each of the seven variables. As indicated in Table 3, the null hypothesis is rejected if the difference between the post- and pre-SAPs values (ie. P) is statistically different at the significance level of .05 (α = .05); it is accepted otherwise.

A. Economic performance and SAPs

22. Conceptually, with X_1 an increase (in the index) over the two time periods should indicate some improvement in the general economic performance of a country. In other words, the values in Column 4 (Table 2) should be largely positive. The data show an overall negative economic performance for virtually all the countries. Subject to the limitations of the index (as noted in para 19), this finding tends to suggest the negative impact of SAPs on African economies. The Wilcoxon test testifies to these results. The null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative that post-SAPs estimates of average annual per capita GNP for 28 of the 36 African countries with SAPs are lower (in absolute value) than those for the pre-SAPs period (Table 3).
Excepting Mauritius, Senegal and Egypt, the direction of change (between the post versus pre SAPs periods) in the values of annual per capita GNP is negative for all the other 25 countries (with data) that have adopted SAPs.

23. Given this finding, it is important to stress the need for care in assessing the role of SAPs in this context. For instance, in the pre-SAPs period (1965 - 80) most African countries were less effected by the external shocks noted in Para 1 (eg. the oil price increases and the collapse in the commodity prices of African exports). Of course , the conventional measure of a country's level and pace of development is per capita GNP and its annual growth rate. However, although useful for many purposes, the limitations of per capita GNP as a development indicator have long been acknowledged (UNICEF, 1989). Obviously, SAPs' objectives did not explicitly include the raising of per capita GNP. But, as an instrument for alleviating the effects of the economic crisis in the region, the logical expectation is that (implicity) post SAPs estimates of per capita GNP should exceed their pre SAPs levels. The fact that this is not the case for the data examined here is in a way supportive of the evidence from several evaluation studies (noted earlier) to date of the negative impact of SAPs on the economic performance of most African countries.

B. Child Mortality and SAPs

24. Regarding child mortality, the explicit expectation is that if SAPs were to have the desired effects of structurally transforming the African economies (UNECA, 1989a: p.2), then infant and child mortality should be considerably reduced in the post-SAPs period (ie. the average annual rate of reduction in child mortality estimates should increase over the SAPs time interval). This implies that the estimated values of average annual reduction rate in under 5 mortality in the post-SAPs period should exceed those in the pre-SAPs period. From the results, this expectation is not realized and the null hypothesis is also rejected (see Table 3). The estimated values of average annual reduction rate in under 5 mortality (column 7 of Table 2) are either very low (less than 1%) or negative. In other words, SAPs did not generally result in effecting reductions in the mortality of the under-5 children. The cases of Sierra Leone (change = 1.0%), Zaire (change = 1.1%) and Senegal (change = 3.0%) are the three main situations where the expected excess of post over pre-SAPs values are fairly significant. Possibly, these enhanced reductions are sequels of other programmes and development-oriented frameworks like the world population plan of action (WPPA) as well as the one deriving from the Alma-Ata Declaration on primary health care and Health for All by the year 2000; the LPA; and, the KPA.

25. Taken together, the general indication is that SAPs were not causal to the desired average annual reduction rate in under-5 mortality. To the extent that this variable measures the end result of the development process, then the negative impact of SAPs on African economies (see paras 22 and 23) have far reaching consequences on the future of the region namely the limited survival chances of the under-5 population in future generations in African countries.

26. As in the case of average annual per capita GNP, reduction in infant/child mortality is an indirect expectation of SAPs as an instrument of development; the explicit objective of SAPs was not necessarily to effect such reductions. In this regard, in its 1984 issue of 'The State of the World's Children', UNICEF had noted that a very real deterioration was taking place in the lives of children around the world consequent upon world recession and economic set-backs (UNICEF, 1984). The report then called on countries to take immediate action so as to prevent further deterioration. Two broad opposing forces have been at work since then, namely: (a) a dramatic acceleration in certain child survival and development actions in many countries (eg. immunization and rehydrations therapy as part of the broad move to strengthen primary health care including clean water supplies, education and other basic services); and (b) the continuation of the downward economic pressures on living standards especially in Latin America and Africa. In the latter, these pressures became extreme in the face of several years of drought (see UNICEF: 1982, 1983 and 1984). As UNICEF puts it: "adjustment with a human face would strengthen and help sustain child survival and development measures simultaneous with enhancing their effectiveness by increasing basic living standards especially for those with low incomes" (UNICEF, 1984).

27. Recently, "The Children Summit" has noted that for the infant mortality rate to be reduced to 50 (or below) per 1000 live births in every country, the plan of action calls for measures to provide universal access to safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, reduction of illiteracy, elimination of such diseases as polio, tetanus, measles, etc. (World Development Forum, 1991). This aspect of 'adjustment with a human face' would not be realized if SAPs continue to discriminate against children. As is well known, SAPs measures to cut spending on health services in combination with declining real wages and rising prices of food is associated with a rise in mortality.

28. Additionally, while the World Bank has been insisting on the need to reduce population growth rates in the developing countries as one of the means to accelerate economic growth rate, the same institution prescribes cuts in health programmes that are expected to provide family planning services. African countries have eventually accepted the need for family planning programmes but they need the means to do so - education, health and information. Under conditions of increasing mortality and lack of means for family planning, reduction in population growth rates cannot be attained. There is need to have health services expanded in order to reduce the high infant, child and maternal mortality rates and provide adequate family planning services.

C. Average family size and SAPs

29. The same expectation is applicable to average annual rate of reduction in total fertility rate (the proxy for average family size). The desired effect of SAPs should be to induce a small family size norm as the ultimate goal of development (i.e values in column 10 of Table 2 should be largely positive). However, from Table 2, about 60 per cent of the 28 member States with data recorded zero average annual reduction rate in their average family size during the post-SAPs period (ie. 1980-87). In virtually all these cases, the pre-SAPs (ie. 1960-80) average annual reductions in average family size were largely negative. Therefore the resulting changes (ie. post-less pre-SAPs

values in column 10 of Table 2) have to be carefully interpreted because on the bases of these changes, Table 3 result implies that orthodox SAPs have had the desired effects in reducing average family size in African countries. This in fact is not the case. Besides, it is to be noted that for contemporary developing nations, the relationship between improved standard of living and family size is not quite clear. In some of the countries, oil revenues have recently implied sudden gains in per capita GNP whereas declines in family sizes have a built-in time lag effect.

30. For instance, recent, ECA estimates indicate that "Africa's seven major oil exporters earned $10.5 billion more in 1990 (of which $5.2 billion went to Nigeria) due to the oil price increase alone, not counting earnings from increased production. This helped push the economic growth rate of these countries to an average of 3.5 per cent (Africa Hall News, 18 January 1991). It can be argued that in the few cases with apparent greater reduction rate in average family size in the post-relative to the pre-SAPs period (eg. Burundi, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe), the explanation is not necessarily an aftermath of SAPs. It is possible that such other factors as integrated maternal and child health with family planning programmes have contributed to the apparent reduction in the family size of these few African countries.

31. Perhaps what is important here is not the failure of SAPs to effect desired reductions in average family size but, orthodox SAPs appear to have drawn attention away from such critical areas of African social situation as the family (Adedeji, 1990). It is suggested that there is a strong correlation between adverse economic situation and family problems (e.g. insecurity). Families that are continually faced with primary poverty are known to be prone to internal domestic conflicts; these tend to impair their ability to perform adult stabilization and child development functions with adverse ramifications for the entire society.

32. In the light of the severe retrogression in other social sectors and on which the family welfare directly depends, the trauma in African families, occasioned by inability of parents to meet basic needs of children, is evidenced in rising incidences of juvenile delinquency, teenage prostitution, drug abuse, alcoholism, armed robbery as well as crimes against private and public property. Additionally, by decreasing the purchasing power of families, housewives in most African countries have had to take up rather 'mean jobs' to supplement the family income with the attendant 'unhealthy exposure' of these women, thus further excerbating the incidence of family in-stability. In terms of sustainable development, these symptoms are unhealthy and should be addressed within alternative frameworks to SAPs.

D. Rural-urban migration flows and SAPs

33. With the average annual growth rate in the urban population, sustainable development should have the effect of reducing the need to migrate from rural to urban areas in search of survival. If SAPs ensured such a development pattern, then by implication, the values in column 13 (Table 2) should be largely negative. This is the case in about 60 per cent of the 28 countries with data. The outcome in Table 3 however, suggests that average annual growth rates of the urban population in the pre- and post-SAPs period were largely the same (since the null hyphothesis is accepted). In this regard, it should be stressed that of the two factors that largely account for urban population growth (ie. natural increase and net migration), available evidence suggests that net migration is the more dominant factor in the African region. Preliminary analysis of the 1990 census of Zambia, for instance, suggests that the urban population growth rate in 1990 was lower than that of 1980 holding constant the natural increase (CSO: Lusaka, 1990). Since Zambia was implementing SAPs during the 1980-90 decade (with a short break between 1987 to mid 1990), this

result could suggest that possibly, in the wake of SAPs, urban living conditions were less conducive than those in the rural areas thereby accentuating the urban-rural exodus. This Zambian example is not an isolated case but probably reflects the trend in most of the 36 African countries that have been implementing SAPs.

34. For instance, besides Zambia, results of the analysis from the censuses of Tanzania (Bureau of Statistics: Dar-es-Salaam, 1990) indicate lower estimates of annual average intercensal growth rate during the 1978-88 relative to the 1967-78 intercensal periods for the largely urbanized regions (eg. Dodoma, Kilimanjaro, Dar-es-Salaam, etc.). Similarly, available estimates of annual rates of growth (%) for the 1970 - 80 period are reported as lower than those for the 1960 - 70 period in 14 African cities[1] (Makannah, T. J., 1990). If the thesis of a systematic worsening of living conditions in the urban areas of African countries consequent upon SAPs is tenable, then there is a strong case for effective integrated rural development programmes in these economies (Makannah, 1990; Annie, 1985; Findley: 1977, 1981 and 1982).

35. In this regard, one of the indices of unfavourable urban living conditions in the face of SAPs is the unemployment phenomenon. This is estimated to have reached the 20-30 per cent mark at the end of the 1980s and is evidenced by widespread proliferation of micro-enterprises in the informal sector which absorbs almost 60 per cent of the urban labour force. As SAPs forced African governments to reduce the size of public sector employment, empirical evidence (JASPA, 1988, 1989) suggests that unemployment rate among educated youths (including university graduates) is rising rapidly. It is to be stressed that this type of unemployment has serious social and political ramifications because of the tremendously high cost and expectation of the training, as well as the centrality of human resources in the African efforts at recovery, growth and long term structural transformation and development.

36. However, since the evidence from the Zambian, Tanzanian and other case findings may not be quite conclusive, it can also be argued that SAPs have not operated to precipitate either the exodus from urban to rural or rural to urban areas. For instance, although no hard data are available, there is evidence of massive out-migration of high-level trained manpower from several African countries to the "oil-rich" areas (e.g. Gulf States) in recent years. Such streams of out-migration (brain drain) are also largely the effects of SAPs. It is therefore suggested that the observed trend (Table 2) may reflect the incidence of the noted brain drain rather than the effect of rural-urban or urban-rural migration flows.

E. Nutritional deficiency/food production and SAPs

37. With daily per capita calorie supply and average index of food production, the desired expectation with sustainable development is a positive trend. Effective structural transformation programmes should ensure 100 per cent requirement both in the per capita calorie supply and food production. This implies that the values in columns 16 and 19 (Table 2) should be largely positive. In the case of daily per capita calorie supply (as % of requirements), the results in Table 3 show that the pre-and post-SAPs estimates were essentially the same (since the null hypothesis is accepted). Possibly, due to cuts (caused by SAPs) in the provision of social services including

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[1] These include Abidjan, Accra, Addis-Ababa, Banjul, Dakar, Dar es-Salaam, Freetown, Harare, Kampala, Kinshasa, Lagos, Lusaka, Nairobi and Yaounde.

subsidies on the incomes of farmers, the prices of essential basic food items have soared to a point that families in most African countries cannot afford to purchase the basic food items.

38. And yet, adequate supply of food is essential for child development and growth. Its lack leads to malnutrition which affects most children, pregnant women and lactating mothers. Malnutrition in children is associated with higher risks of mortality. Food price increases resulting from SAPs and measures like devaluation and removal of subsidies generally increase the incidence of malnutrition. Indeed the cumulative effects of nutritional deficiency in African countries are widespread and have resulted in unprecedented malnutrition among children. Available evidence indicates that by the end of the 1980s, almost 40 percent of pre-school children in Subsaharan Africa suffered from acute protein deficiency (Adedeji, 1990). Such severe malnutrition in early childhood affects later labour productivity in adulthood with the potential of jeopardazing the growth of African economies.

39. Regarding per capita annual index in food production, the results in Table 3 suggest that post-SAPs food production in African countries have exceeded the pre-SAPs situation (since the null hypothesis is rejected). This was expected because in the face of high prices particularly for non-farm food items, the population in most African countries resorted to small-scale farming in order to sustain life. The achievement of self sufficiency in the production of basic staple food items particularly in the rural areas of most of these countries is perhaps one of the positive aftermaths of SAPs in African countries. But this does not necessarily ensure a balanced diet for these rural populations. It is in this connection that one of the recommendations from the Khartoum Declaration becomes pertinent namely that (at the national level) even in times of severe resource constraints, attempts should be made by African countries to ensure acceptable minimum levels of, and access to food and social services particularly for the vulnerable groups (UNECA, 1988).

F. Education and SAPs

40. With education the desired expectation is a positive trend in primary level school enrolment. This goal is not realized from the results in Table 3 since the null hypothesis is rejected. From Table 2, about 43 per cent of the 28 countries with data experienced considerable reductions in primary school enrolment in the post-SAPs period. This is at variance with the fact that sustainable development and the policy of promoting education are mutually reinforcing.

41. And yet the World Bank recommends the introduction of fees for education and hospital services. World Bank sponsored study in Malawi, showed that an increase in primary school fees reduced primary school enrolment by as much as 26 per cent. (Mohammed, 1990). By implication, this particular policy reform would, upon implementation, "alienate the vast majority of people on the poverty line from the benefits of these services; strengthen traditional tendencies; and, reduce the scope for effective grassroot participation in the development process". From the point of view of long term development, the reduction in public expenditure in education necessitated by SAPs has meant a reversal of the process of heavy investment in human resource development initiated in the early 1960s to forge structural transformation in African economies (Mohammed, 1990).

42. In effect, the idea of education for all has been brought to a halt in many African countries because of the debt crisis and government cuts in spending. In the past few years, there has been unprecedented halt in the growth of basic educational services, stagnation and deterioration of educational quality. Educational facilities and materials leave much to be desired in many African

countries. School buildings are crumbling, educational materials such as books, stationery and equipment are either non-existent or inadequate. In some cases, the shift system has been introduced in order to accommodate the high numbers of students who need education. Additionally, the pupil teacher ratios are very high with the result that there is no adequate personal attention to ensure effective teaching.

43. Thus the consequences of implementing SAPs in their conventional form are associated with larger numbers of illiterates. This in turn is associated with larger numbers of the population without gainful employment. Without employment, the population would not have access to other basic needs all of which need to be paid for (eg, health services, food, shelter, transportation, water and sanitation services, clothing etc). In effect, education has strong relationship with all other socio-economic sectors, and is necessary for socio-economic and sustained development. Technological innovations depend on the education of the people; better and improved health is related to education. The same is true with child survival, improvements in agriculture, and employment opportunities.

II. ENDOGENIZING POPULATION FACTORS WITHIN AAF-SAP

44. Thus far in this analysis, some preliminary data have been examined on the possible effects of SAPs and selected population related corrolates principally to identify relevant factors that could be used to enhance the effectiveness of population policy measures. The analysis reveals that in most African countries where SAPs have been implemented, the social costs have been enormous. Food subsidies had to be discontinued simultaneously with cutting expenditures on health, education and other social services, ostensibly in order to balance budgets and release resources for servicing debts. In some cases, riots are reported to have resulted from the SAPs squeeze (Chanda, 1990; Isamah, 1990).

45. Among the six population related corrolates of SAPs examined, four have been identified as requiring particular emphasis in population policy formulation. These include (a) mortality of under-5 children; (b) family cohesion; (c) malnutrition of children; and, (iv) education of children. Contemporary generations of under-5 children will constitute the core of the future labour force in African countries. Therefore inadequate health, feeding and educational provisions for these children today would certainly produce an 'ill-prepared' labour force for future African populations. Equally, the gradual destruction of the family unit could produce seeds for the complete erosion of law and order as well as destroy a potent cohesive force in the development process of these countries.

46. Future national population programmes of African countries should therefore make special provisions to accommodate these four amd other related concerns as an integral part of overall national development strategies. This point is important because given the economic crisis, many African children are "growing in circumstances under which: (a) they may never fulfil the mental and physical potential with which they were born; (b) they will not be able to derive maximum benefit from the educational opportunities available; and, (c) their abilities to work productively and be rewarded accordingly might be restricted." These traits imply that "the children might be less likely to protect the health and normal growth of generations yet unborn." Breaking this self-perpetuating cycle should be central to the African development process (UNICEF, 1989: pp.60-61).

47. It will be recalled that although some African countries have formulated and implemented national population policies for almost three decades, these have been largely ineffective in terms

of curbing rapid population growth rates. Among the causes of failure is an inadequate understanding of the socio-economic miliue (within which development programmes are couched) namely the family. In essence, this means a lack of understanding of the role of women within the family and the larger framework of society (UNECA, 1989c).[2] As just noted, one area requiring emphasis in future African population policy formulation and implementation is to ensure family cohesion through fostering an understanding and improving the status and role of women in the development process.

48. Recently traditional policy measures for mitigating these problem areas in African countries have largely derived from the 84 KPA recommendations addressed to African countries in nine main areas[3] and largely funded by UNFPA. At this time when the AAF-SAP framework has been developed to assist African countries to effect structural transformation of their economies, there is need to ensure that the population policy measures incorporate as an integral part of AAF-SAP, the factors identified in this analysis. To the extent that these factors derive from an analysis associated with the regional economic crisis, they are dynamic and responsive to the socio-economic realities of the region. The list of these factors could be increased when additional data sets are analysed. In order to indicate how the four areas of emphasis can be integrated into the overall development strategy, the process of endogenizing population factors in the latter is first presented.

49. An outline and current policy instruments of AAF-SAP were presented in Section I. Additionally, it was (i) noted that no specific provision has yet been provided for the role of population within the framework; and, (ii) the endogenization of population variables in the development planning process should constitute an additional policy instrument of AAF-SAP to ensure that it provides a holistic and fully integrated framework to population development planning process in the African region. The said endogenization process has been presented in two earlier ECA documents (UNECA: 1988, 1990). The highlights are reiterated here for emphasis.

50. In operational terms, the said 'endogenization' process implies simultaneous formulation and implementation of national development and population programmes. When both programmes are so implemented, their effects can be mutually beneficial. The long-term goal of development programmes is to minimize and/or eliminate the incidence of poverty, unemployment and income inequality; this takes time to materialize. On the one hand, a national population programme is aimed, among other goals, at fostering a small family size norm. With most African countries having large family sizes currently, a national population programme can minimize the chances of rapid population growth frustrating development efforts in the short run before the long-term goals of development programmes are realized. On the other hand, when this development goal is

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[2] For a fuller discussion of these factors see "The status and prospects of population policies in ECA member States", African Population Series, No. 10 (UNECA, 1989, pp. 42-82.

[3] The nine main areas within which the 84 KPA recommendations can be subsumed are population and development; fertility and family planning; mortality and morbidity; urbanization and migration; changing role of women in the development process; children and youth; community development; population information; and data collection, training and research.

attained, a small family size necessarily becomes an implicit norm. It is in this sense that the simultaneous implementation of both programmes can yield mutually reinforcing benefits.

51. In order to foster the endogenization of population factors in the development process, four sets of activities are pertinent. The first is to determine the conceptual framework. This involves a study of the interrelationships between population and development-related data (pertaining to the base year of a development plan period) using an appropriate socio-economic demographic model. The interrelationships so derived should be carefully analysed in terms of their implications for the national development planning.

52. Such implications should constitute the basis for deriving the demographic objectives to be attained in the course of implementing the development plan. In determining these objectives, the factors derived here (e.g. effecting reductions in under-5 mortality, fostering family cohesion, etc.) should be borne in mind. Policies and programmes should then be formulated in pursuance of these objectives. This activity should be undertaken for each sector. For consistency, each sector should be provided with appropriate guidelines to enable it establish the said interrelationships and objectives together with the associated policies and programmes. The set of policies, programmes and projects so derived should then be 'put together' and prioritized consistent with the overall government priorities (for the plan period) and available resources. This is the 'heart' of the endogenization process and is the missing link in past and contemporary efforts at integrating population factors in the development plans of African countries.

53. By ensuring that the demographic objectives of the developement plans derive from research findings using pertinent population and development-related data of the country as well as relevant socio-economic demographic models, the endogenization of population factors in the planning process would have been enhanced. The non-compliance with this desideratum is tantamount to 'exogenous' treatment of the population factor in the planning process... the bane of failure in past and contemporary attempts by African countries at integrating population factors in the development planning process.

54. The activities involved in determining the conceptual framework for the endogenization process are enormous and necessarily raise the question of who does what? The issue of institutional arrangements thus constitutes the second activity in the process. In the "Guidelines" prepared earlier by the ECA secretariat for integrating population factors in the development plans of its member States (UNECA, 1988), two sets of institutions have been proposed. To enhance the formulation of a national population programme, it is suggested that a National Population Commission (NPC), a Population Planning Unit (PPU) and a Data/Policy Unit (DPU) should be established. The division of labour between these units relative to the various responsibilities involved in the first activity (just outlined) is spelt out in the "Guidelines".

55. Thereafter a Multisectoral Committee (MSC) should be constituted to oversee the implementation aspects of the national population programme so formulated. This committee should then constitute a task force for each of the population policy measures. The responsibility of each task force in this regard would be to overview the problems per policy measure using existing prior knowledge in the country. The aim of the review should be to come up with suggested solutions, an action agenda and a budget for implementing each policy measure. Together (i.e., for policy measures), these reviews should constitute a background paper for an "Action Workshop" for implementing the resulting national population programme.

56. The third set of activities relates to the issue of needed training. The question at this point is whether the country has in place trained and available personnel to perform the various activities noted under the first activity as well as fill the positions noted under the second activity. Again in the said "Guidelines", it has been suggested that a training programme should be developed at the formal and middle-level and political cadres to provide the needed skills (where gaps exist).

57. Finally, the dissemination of information generated by the whole endogenization process is the fourth activity. Information is needed on availability and accessibility of existing data in the area of population and development planning in the country; the modalities for such dissemination are crucial to the success of the integration process. A regional project (POPIN-AFRICA) was instituted in 1984 to promote such dissemination amongst policy-makers, planners, researchers, etc.

58. Given these activities, a national development programme based on the AAF-SAP framework should (i) address the issue of minimizing and/or eliminating the incidence of poverty, unemployment and income inequality simultaneous with focusing on such social issues as health, education, malnutrition and family cohesion; (ii) incorporate the endogenization process (as just outlined); and, (iii) ensure that the demographic objectives of the national population programme are dynamic in nature and related to the socio-economic realities of the country. This means that it should include such factors as derived in this study (e.g. effecting declines in under-5 mortality and average family size).

III. CONCLUSION

59. This paper has examined the apparent effects of structural adjustment programmes on selected population related corrolates in African countries. Although the secondary data examined are exploratory, the assessment has revealed that the determination of the impact of SAPs on the various population aspects is difficult principally because the relationship between the two is more implicit than explicit.

60. Subject to the limitations of average annual growth rate in per capita GNP, the assessment notes that as an instrument intended to alleviate the effects of the current economic crisis in the region, post-SAPs estimates did not (as would normally be expected) exceed their pre-SAPs levels; hence SAPs have had a negative impact on the economic performance of African countries that implemented them. Regarding under-5 mortality and average family size, the general indication is that although other factors also influence both variables, SAPs were not causal to the desired average annual reduction rates. In the case of rural-urban migration flows, the assessment suggests that unfavourable urban living conditions in the face of SAPs (and other factors) have tended to encourage urban-rural migration flows, thus strengthening the case for effective integrated rural development programmes. On food production, generally SAPs have resulted in increased incidence of malnutrition particularly for the growing children. With education, the main effect of SAPs is to initiate a trend towards lowering of standards.

61. The assessment then identified some factors that deserve emphasis in future considerations of population policy measures as an integral part of the overall development strategy in African countries. Among these factors are under-5 mortality, family cohesion, malnutrition and education. It is stressed that utilizing factors so derived will focus population policy measures in the region on the current economic crisis.

62. The paper then outlined the main highlights of a framework (AAF-SAP) developed by ECA to ensure that SAPs become effective and notes that for the said framework to fully realize its potentialities, development programmes (based on it) should take account of such population factors (as just noted) in the process. It is suggested that the endogenization of population factors in the development process should constitute an additional policy instrument of AAF-SAP. The paper then provides an outline of the said endogenization process.

Table 1. Classification of ECA member States by year

No	Countries	Year of adopting SAPs: SBA	SAA
1.	Burundi	1965	1986
2.	Chad	-	1987
3.	Central African Republic	1980	1987
4.	Congo	1977	-
5.	Cote d'Ivoire	1984	-
6.	Egypt	1962	-
7.	Equatorial Guinea	1980	1988
8.	Gabon	1978	-
9.	Gambia	1977	1986
10.	Ghana	1966	-
11.	Guinea	1982	1987
12.	Guinea-Bissau	-	1987
13.	Kenya	1978	1988
14.	Liberia	1963	-
15.	Madagascar	1977	1987
16.	Malawi	1979	-
17.	Mali	1964	1988
18.	Mauritania	1977	1986
19.	Mauritius	1978	-
20.	Morocco	1982	-
21.	Mozambique	-	1987
22.	Niger	1983	1986
23.	Nigeria	1986	-
24.	Rwanda	1966	-
25.	Sao Tome and Principe		-
26.	Senegal	1979	1986
27.	Sierra Leone	1966	1986
28.	Somalia	1964	1987
29.	Sudan	1966	-
30.	Tanzania	1975	1987
31.	Togo	1979	1988
32.	Tunisia	1964	-
33.	Uganda	1971	1987
34.	Zaire	1967	1987
35.	Zambia	1973	-
36.	Zimbabwe	1981	-

Note: EFF = Extended Fund Facility
ESAA = Enhanced Structural Adjustment Arrang
EXTA = Extended Arrangements
SAA = Structural Adjustment Arrangements
SBA = Stand-by Arrangements
SAL = World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans
the special Facility for Africa and special joint fi

Source: UNECA, Statistics and policies:
Report "Africa's Adjustment and

adopting IMF and World Bank supported SAPs

SAL	EXTA	ESAA	EFF
1986	-	-	-
-	-	-	-
1985	-	-	-
-	-	-	-
1981	-	-	-
-	-	-	-
1986	-	-	-
-	-	-	1980
1986	-	1988	-
1986	1987	1988	-
1986	-	-	-
1985	-	-	-
1980	-	-	1975
-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-
1981	1983	1988	1983
1987	-	-	-
1985	-	-	-
1981	-	-	-
-	-	-	1980
-	-	-	-
1986	-	1988	-
-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-
-	1986	-	- -
1980	-	1988	1980
-	-	-	1981
-	-	-	-
-	-	-	1979
-	-	-	-
1983	-	-	-
-	1988	-	-
-	-	-	-
1987	-	-	1981
-	-	-	1981
-	-	-	-

nents

hich include IBRD or IDA loans for adjustment,
ncing; but excludes sectoral adjustment loans).

CA preliminary observation on the World Bank
rowth in the 1980s", (UNECA, 1989).

Table 2. Population related corrolates of Structural

No.	ECA member State	AGNPC (%) 1965-80	AGNPC (%) 1980-87	AGNPC (%) Change	U5MRAARR 1960-80	U5MRAARR 1980-87	U5MRAARR Change	TFRAARR 1960-80	TFRAARR 1980-
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Burundi	2.4	-0.1	-2.5	0.9	1.7	0.8	-0.8	0.2
2	Chad	-1.9	-2.9	-1.0	1.3	1.6	0.3	0.1	0.0
3	Congo	2.7	1.7	-1.0	-	-	-	-	-
4	Cote D'Ivoire	2.8	-3.0	-5.8	2.3	2.0	-0.3	-0.1	0.0
5	C.A. Republic	0.8	-0.7	-1.5	1.2	1.1	-0.1	-0.3	0.0
6	Egypt	2.8	2.9	0.1	3.0	3.4	0.4	1.4	1.2
7	Eq. Guinee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	Gabon	5.6	-3.5	-9.1	-	-	-	-	-
9	Ghana	-0.8	-2.0	-1.2	1.5	1.5	0.0	0.3	0.2
10	Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	Guinea	0.8	-1.4	-2.2	-	-	-	-	-
12	Guinea Bissau	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	Kenya	3.1	-0.9	-4.0	2.2	2.0	-0.2	-0.1	0.0
14	Liberia	0.5	-5.2	-5.7	2.0	2.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0
15	Madagascar	-0.4	-3.7	-3.3	2.6	2.0	-0.6	0.0	0.0
16	Malawi	3.2	0.0	-3.2	1.0	1.7	0.7	-0.1	0.0
17	Mali	2.1	0.5	-1.6	0.7	1.3	0.6	-0.2	0.0
18	Mauritania	-0.1	-1.6	-1.5	1.3	1.6	0.3	0.0	0.0
19	Mauritius	3.7	4.4	0.7	4.5	4.6	0.1	3.9	4.4
20	Morocco	2.7	0.3	-2.4	2.8	3.1	0.3	1.1	2.2
21	Mozambique	-	-8.2		-	-		-	-
22	Niger	-2.5	-4.9	-2.4	1.1	1.6	0.5	-0.1	0.0
23	Nigeria	4.2	-4.7	-8.9	2.4	1.6	-0.8	-0.2	0.2
24	Rwanda	1.6	-1.0	-2.6	0.4	1.4	1.0	-0.6	0.3
25	SaoTome & Principe	-	-		-	-		-	-
26	Senegal	-0.5	0.1	0.6	2.1	5.1	3.0	0.2	0.2
27	Sierra Leone	0.7	-2.0	-2.7	1.3	1.5	0.2	-0.2	0.0
28	Somalia	-0.1	-2.5	-2.4	0.9	1.4	0.5	0.0	0.0
29	Sudan	0.8	-4.3	-5.1	1.7	1.9	0.2	0.1	0.4
30	Tanzania	0.8	-1.7	-2.5	1.1	1.7	0.6	-0.2	0.0
31	Togo	1.7	-3.4	-5.1	2.8	1.8	-1.0	0.0	0.0
32	Tunisia	4.7	0.7	-4.0	4.1	3.9	-0.2	1.5	3.5
33	Uganda	-2.2	-2.4	-0.2	0.9	1.3	0.4	0.0	0.0
34	Zaire	-1.3	-2.5	-1.2	1.8	2.9	1.1	-0.1	0.0
35	Zambia	-1.2	-5.6	-4.4	2.2	1.7	-0.5	-0.4	0.0
36	Zimbabwe	1.7	-1.3	-3.0	1.6	1.9	0.3	0.8	1.2
	MEAN(for 28 countries)	1.0	-1.6	-2.7	1.8	2.1	0.3	0.2	0.5

N/B

AGNPC = Average annual growth rate in per capita GNP (%)
U5MRAARR = Average annual reduction rate in under five mortality rat
TFRAARR = Average annual reduction rate in total fertility rate
UPOPAAGR = Average annual growth rate in urban population
DPCCALS = Daily per capita calorie supply (as % of requirements)
CAIFPROD = Per capita annual index in food production
PR1ENROL = Primary school enrolment (as % of age group)

Source : The State of the World's Children, 1984 thru 1991 (UNICEF; Oxfo
ECA preliminary observations on the World Bank Report: "Africa

djustment Programmes (SAPs) in African countries

an-ge	UPOPAAGR 1965-80	1980-87	Chan-ge	DPCCALS 1980	1984-86	Chan-ge	CAIPROD 1978	1988	Chan ge	PRIENPOL 1979-81	1986-88	Chan-ge
0	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
.0	1.8	8.9	7.1	96	97	1	100	102	2	28	67	39
.1	9.2	7.4	-1.8	74	69	-5	96	105	9	35	51	16
	3.5	4.3	0.8	94	117	23	82	94	12	-	-	
.1	8.7	6.6	-2.1	112	110	-2	110	94	-16	76	79	3
.3	4.8	4.4	-0.4	94	86	-8	102	83	-19	69	66	-3
.2	2.9	3.6	0.7	117	132	15	96	120	24	76	90	14
	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
	4.2	6.3	2.1		107		-	79		-	-	
.1	3.4	4.2	0.8	88	76	-12	74	108	34	69	71	2
	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
	6.6	5.6	-1.0	77	77	0	87	-		16	30	14
	-	-		102	-		83	-		8	18	10
.1	9.0	8.2	-0.8	88	92	4	85	90	5	110	96	-14
.2	6.2	5.7	-0.5	114	102	-12	95	93	-2	66	35	-31
.0	5.7	6.1	0.4	109	106	-3	94	91	-3	94	94	0
.1	7.8	7.7	-0.1	94	102	8	96	83	-13	60	66	6
.2	4.9	3.9	-1.0	85	86	1	88	108	20	38	23	-15
.0	12.4	7.4	-5.0	97	92	-5	77	91	14	33	52	19
.5	4.0	1.3	-2.7	119	121	2	88	99	11	103	106	3
.1	4.2	4.3	0.1	110	118	8	81	122	41	77	71	-6
	11.8	10.0	-1.8	70	69	-1	73	82	9	-	68	
.1	6.9	7.0	0.1	92	100	8	93	98	5	23	29	6
.4	4.8	6.1	1.3	91	90	-1	91	96	5	82	64	-18
.9	6.3	7.9	1.6	88	81	-7	104	75	-29	71	67	-4
	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
.0	4.1	3.6	-0.5	100	99	-1	76	103	27	48	60	12
.2	4.3	5.2	0.9	89	81	-8	81	89	8	38	58	20
.0	6.1	5.9	-0.2	100	90	-10	65	98	33	30	20	-10
.3	5.1	4.1	-1.0	101	88	-13	102	100	-2	52	49	-3
.2	8.7	11.2	2.5	83	96	13	91	86	-5	104	66	-38
.0	7.2	6.3	-0.9	95	97	2	90	87	-3	117	101	-16
.0	4.2	2.9	-1.3	116	123	7	124	90	-34	106	116	10
.0	4.1	5.2	1.1	83	95	12	86	82	-4	50	70	20
.1	7.2	4.6	-2.6	94	98	4	87	94	7	90	76	-14
.4	7.1	6.7	-0.4	93	92	-1	92	92	0	95	97	2
.4	7.5	5.5	-2.0	86	89	3	92	97	5	116	128	12
.3	6.0	5.8	-0.2	97	97	0	91	96	4	70	70	0

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Table 3. Results from Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test
(Using the variables in Table 2)

Variables	Associated T-value	Derived Z-value	Hypotheses	Derived B from Z	Outcome
X_1 = AGNPC	79 (N=28)	- 2.82	H0 : $X_1(t_1) = X_1(t_2)$ $H_1 : X_1(t_1) < X_1(t_2)$	.00240	Reject H_0 SAPs have a negative impact on X_1
X_2 = U5MR	-111.5 (N=26)	- 7.29	$H_0 : X_2(t_1) = X_2t_2)$ $H_1 : X_2(t2) < X_2(t1)$	.00003	Reject H_0 SAPs have a negative impact on X_2
X_3 = TFRAARR	53 (N=22)	2.39	$H_0 : X_3(t_1) = X_3(t_2)$ $H_1 : X_3(t_2) > X_3(t_1)$	.0084	Reject H_0 SAPs have a negative impact on X_3
X_4 = UPOPAAGR	149.5 (N=28)	-1.2183	$H_0 : X_4(t_1) = X_4(t_2)$ $H_1 : X_4(t_2) < X_4(t_1)$	.1112	Accept H_0 SAPs have a positive impact on X_4
X_5 = DPCCALS	-203.5 (N=28)	-0.0011	$H_0 : X_5(t_1) = X5(t_2)$ $H_1 : X_5(t_2) < X_5(t_1)$	.5000	Accept H_0 SAPs have a positive impact on X_5
X_6 = CAIFPROD	-157 (N-27)	-8.31	$H_0 : X_6(t_1) = X_6(t_2)$ $H_1 : X_6(t_2) > X_6(t_1)$	.00003	Reject H_0 SAPs have a negative impact on X_6
X_7 = PRIENROL	167 (N=27)	-8.55	$H_0 : X_7(t_1) = X_7(t_2)$ $H_1 : X_7(t_2) > X_7(t_1)$	.00003	Reject H_0 SAPs have a negative impact on X_7

N/B t_1 = pre-SAP period; t_2 = post-SAP period
H_0 = Null hypothesis; H_1 = Research hypothesis
Reject H_0 if $B \leq a(.05)$

Source : Derived from Table 2.

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